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The Dynamics of Social Assistance Receipt: 
Measurement and Modelling Issues, with an Application to Britain
*
 
We model the dynamics of social assistance benefit receipt in Britain using data from the 
British Household Panel Survey, waves 1–15. First, we discuss definitions of social 
assistance benefit receipt, and present information about the trends between 1991 and 2005 
in the receipt of social assistance benefits, and in annual rates of transition into and out of 
receipt. Second, we review potential multivariate modelling approaches especially the 
dynamic random effects probit models that are used in our empirical analysis and, third, 
discuss sample selection criteria and explanatory variables. Fourth, we present our 
regression estimation estimates and interpret them. The final section contains a summary of 
the substantive results, and highlights some lessons concerning application of the analysis 
for other countries and some methodological issues. 
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* Research commissioned by the OECD under contract JA00045191. We thank Thomas Andrén, 
Martin Biewen, Jürgen Hansen, Herwig Immervoll, Chris Orme, Lucinda Platt, and Mark Stewart for 
helpful comments, and Alfonso Miranda for allowing us to use his Stata programs. This report is also 
released as OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper 67. Introduction and background 
 
The Social Policy Division of the OECD has commissioned us “[t]o prepare a paper on the 
Dynamics of Receipt of Social Assistance Benefits in the United Kingdom. The analysis is to 
be based on panel data for the UK. One purpose of the paper is to serve as a basis for similar, 
but independent, studies for other countries. It is expected that this objective will be taken 
into account in setting out the modelling approach and discussing conceptual and data-related 
issues.” 
 
In Section 1, we discuss the definition of ‘receipt of social assistance benefits’, and explain 
what is possible to measure using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). In Section 2, 
we report trends between 1991 and 2005 in the receipt of social assistance benefits in Britain, 
and in annual rates of transition into and out of receipt. We provide an outline of potential 
approaches to the multivariate modelling of the dynamics of receipt in Section 3, focusing on 
the dynamic binary random effects probit models that have been employed in similar analysis 
for Sweden and for Canada. Sample selection criteria and explanatory variables are discussed 
in Section 4. We also summarize trends in explanatory variables over the period. In Section 5, 
we present the estimates of a series of multivariate regression models, and interpret them in 
relation to the evidence about trends. We summarize the implications of the estimates in 
terms of a series of the transition probabilities and expected spell lengths for for individuals 
with different sets of characteristics. Section 6 contains a summary of the substantive results 
and highlights some lessons for applications of the analysis to other countries and some 
methodological issues. Appendix A provides details about the software used and alternatives 
considered. Appendix B contains additional estimation results, supplementing those reported 
in the main text. 
 
The focus throughout is on individuals of working age. More specifically, we consider only 
individuals below the age of 60. (The state retirement pension age in Britain is 60 for woman 
and 65 for men.) To avoid complications associated with education and training we also 
exclude individuals aged less than 25, or individuals in benefit units in which there are any 
adults of working age who are full-time students.  
 
 
1. The definition of ‘social assistance benefit receipt’ 
 
Any empirical analysis of the dynamics of social assistance receipt requires definitions for 
three components: 
•  The benefit-receiving unit 
•  The income sources included in ‘social assistance benefits’ 
•  The time period over which the benefit(s) are received. 
We discuss these in turn. 
 
 
The benefit-receiving unit 
 
In Britain, the assessment of eligibility for benefits is based on the income of the ‘benefit 
unit’. This unit is essentially the nuclear family, referring to a single person or a couple living 
together with or without dependent children. A dependent child is aged less than 16 years, or 
more than 16 years but under 19 years and unmarried, in full-time non-advanced education 
and living with his/her parents. For brevity, we shall simply refer to children rather than 
  1dependent children. The benefit unit differs from the ‘household’. A household may contain 
several benefit units. Examples of this are a non-dependent child living with his parents (two 
benefit units), or three single adults sharing a house (three benefit units). Among persons of 
working age, there are four main ‘client groups’ of benefit units: couples with one or more 
children, couples without children, single adults with one or more children (lone parent 
families), and single adults. 
 
Although only one individual within a benefit unit is the benefit claimant, the family-based 
means test means that all the individuals within a benefit unit are assumed by the benefit 
system to gain from the income provided by a social security benefit. That is, there are 
multiple recipients within each benefit unit (other than within single adult benefit units).  
 
Benefit units cannot be followed over time in any consistent manner. Benefit units change 
composition over time as individuals arrive (e.g. via birth of a child or marriage) or depart 
(e.g. via a child becoming non-dependent or leaving home, death or divorce). And these types 
of change are common (see e.g. Jenkins 2000). Thus one can only follow individuals over 
time, though of course one can characterise individuals in terms of their benefit unit’s 
characteristics including receipt status at a given point in time. 
 
There are, however, practical issues for empirical analysis concerning the tracking of 
recipient and non-recipient individuals over time. When modelling the dynamics of receipt of 
social assistance, should each benefit unit at a particular point in time be represented in the 
data set by one individual (and, if so, which one), or should there be as many observations as 
there are members of the benefit unit?  
 
On the one hand, if one is interested in modelling persistence in receipt to learn about 
changes in the number of claimants over time, this suggests that one should focus on one 
individual per benefit unit, viz the claimant, in so far as he or she can be identified from the 
survey data, or another key individual such as the head of benefit unit (defined below). On 
the other hand, if one is interested in modelling persistence in receipt from a recipient 
perspective, this suggests that every member of a benefit unit should be represented in the 
data. The choice is complicated by the fact that a person may become a claimant or stop 
being a claimant separately from whether or not the person’s benefit unit is in receipt. For 
example, consider a lone mother who is a benefit claimant (and in receipt) in year t. At t+1, 
she repartners with a man and it is he who is now the benefit claimant (and benefit unit head). 
He was also the head of a (separate) benefit unit in year t, though his benefit unit was not in 
receipt. The woman’s receipt status has not changed, but her claimant status has. The man’s 
receipt status has changed, but he has remained a benefit unit head and potential claimant. In 
the example described, a longitudinal data set should track both the woman and the man over 
time, and count her as remaining in receipt and him as moving into receipt. More generally, 
we believe that is the changes in receipt status rather than claimant status that are more 
relevant to analysis of benefit dynamics. 
 
In sum, we track working-age adult individuals over time, and characterize each individual’s 
receipt status at each point in time in terms of whether anyone in their benefit unit was 
receiving social assistance benefits at that time. We do not track dependent children over time 
as well on the grounds that they are dependent – their benefit receipt status at a particular 
time depends entirely on their parents. ‘Children’ are included in the analysis if and when 
they become non-dependent, i.e. adults in their right. In order to focus on receipt by persons 
of working age, we did not consider benefit units in which the respondent or spouse if present 
  2was aged more than 60 years or less than 25 years. We also excluded all individuals in benefit 
units in which any adult was a full-time student. 
 
Our choice means that we have repeated observations from the same benefit unit at each 
interview, so introducing a lack of independence between observations. This means that 
parameter estimates in multivariate models may be subject to bias. Essentially the amount of 
information provided by the data is not as large as the nominal sample size suggests. 
However, it is unclear what the magnitude of the bias is likely to be. A similar issue arises in 
the modelling of individual unemployment dynamics where the estimation sample includes 
both men and women, though we have not seen the issue explicitly discussed.
1 E.g. Stewart 
(2007) modelled men’s and women’s unemployment dynamics using BHPS data, and some 
of the men and women in his sample lived together in a marital partnership. Like Stewart, we 
ignore this complication. 
 
Following adults over time is the most commonly-used practice in the literature to date,
2 but 
there are subtle differences in practice between studies in terms of which adults are followed 
and in the definition of benefit receipt. Andrén (2007) analyzed social assistance dynamics 
using the Swedish Income Panel, a register-based panel data set based on a random sample of 
the Swedish working age population in 1990. He tracked individuals aged 18–50 years over 
time. Because the sample is of individuals rather than households, his data set does not 
include all the individuals from a given household in each year. So, although there is a 
household means-test for social assistance benefits in Sweden, the nature of the data means 
that Andrén defines receipt in terms of whether the sample person received social assistance 
at least once during a calendar year (i.e. not whether any person in the individual’s household 
was in receipt). Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang (2006) used the Canadian Survey of Labour 
and Income Dynamics (SLID), a rotating panel to compare social assistance benefit dynamics 
across Canadian provinces. They state that each household is represented by one person at 
each point in time: ‘the person selected by Statistics Canada as the response person’ (p. 8), 
and a ‘household is defined as a welfare participating household, in any given year, if any 
person belonging to the household received any social assistance at any time during that year’ 
(p. 8). However, throughout their paper they refer to tracking households over time (note the 
model specification in their Section 5), and it is unclear how they treat the issue of household 
demographic change and potential changes in who is counted as a household response person 
(see the earlier discussion). Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) compared social assistance receipt 
dynamics for Swedish natives and immigrants using the Longitudinal Individual Data, a 
register-based data set consisting of a large panel of individuals, and their household 
members, which is representative of the Swedish population from 1960 to 2001. Analysis is 
of men and women between the ages of 18 and 65, excluding students and retired individuals, 
tracked between 1991 and 2001. However, it appears that benefit receipt is defined on an 
individual basis rather than household basis: ‘a person as a welfare/UI recipient in a given 
year if he or she received welfare for at least a month and/or received more than one-half of 
the so-called “basic amount” … in unemployment benefits during the year (2006, p. 9). 
Enberg, Gottschalk and Wolf, (1990) use administrative data from Wisconsin on receipt of 
Aid for Families with Dependent Children. (See also Boskin and Nold (1975).) Individual 
adults are followed over time. Receipt is defined on an individual rather than household basis, 
                                                 
1 The issue does not arise in the administrative record data sets for which only one individual is sampled per 
household. 
2 One exception is our previous research on poverty dynamics (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004) also based on 
analysis of the BHPS. We tracked all individuals (adults and children) over time. Another exception is Biewen’s  
(2004) study of poverty dynamics, in which the fortunes of men aged between 18 and 65 years were tracked. 
  3but this is appropriate because the benefit-recipient unit for AFDC was the individual (the 
programme targeted lone parents).  
 
 
The income sources included in ‘social assistance benefits’ 
 
Social assistance benefits are cash benefits paid to bring incomes up to some minimum 
income level – they refer to income maintenance. By contrast, social insurance benefits refer 
to income replacement. They are payments made in response to the occurrence of particular 
risky events such as sickness or unemployment and for which an appropriate record of social 
insurance contributions exists. (See e.g. the OECD Glossary of statistical terms used in the 
National Accounts at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2478.)  
 
According to these definitions, the principal social assistance benefits in Britain for people of 
working age are those shown in Table 1. For an overview of the British system of social 




Income Support (IS) and income-based Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) differ from Housing 
Benefit (HB) and Council Tax Benefit (CTB) because receipt depends on employment status. 
Put differently, receipt of HB and CTB depends on income (and some other conditions), but 




The principal social assistance benefits in the UK today 
Benefit Eligibility  conditions  (main) 
Income Support  Income less than a specified minimum level, and unavailable 
for full-time work (e.g. lone parent, registered sick or disabled, 
caring for someone who’s sick or elderly) 
Job Seekers Allowance 
(income based) 
Income less than a specified minimum level, and unemployed 
but able to work and available to work 
Housing Benefit   Income less than a specified minimum level, and needing 
financial help to pay all or part of one’s housing costs
Council Tax Benefit  Income less than a specified minimum level, and needing 
financial help to pay all or part of one’s Council Tax bill
Notes: Income Support was introduced in 1988 (its predecessor was called Supplementary Benefit). Housing 
Benefit was introduced in 1983 and Council Tax Benefit in 1993. Job Seekers Allowance was introduced in 
1996. See the main text for further discussion. 
 
 
Arguably, according to the definitions above, in-work benefits (notably Working Tax Credit 
at present) might also be counted as providing social assistance benefits because no national 
insurance contribution record is required for receipt and one of the principal eligibility 
conditions relates to having an income below a specified minimum level.
3 (The other main 
                                                 
3 The UK has had means-tested in-work benefit programmes for low-income working families with children 
since 1971, when Family Income Supplement (FIS) was introduced. There have been major increases in 
generosity and changes to eligibility conditions since then that have led to substantial expansion of receipt. In 
particular, FIS became Family Credit (FC) in 1988. FC was replaced by Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) 
  4requirement is to have a family member in full-time work – at least 16 hours per week.) 
Against this argument for counting tax credits as social assistance is that one of the key ideas 
underlying the substantial extension of tax credits by the Labour government since 1998 is 
that tax credits are not ‘welfare benefits’ – they are a key plank in Labour’s ‘welfare to work’ 
programme (note the wording). Reflecting this, tax credits are administered by HM Revenue 
and Customs, the government department that administers income taxation and national 
insurance contributions, rather than by the Department for Work and Pensions (which 
administers IS and JSA).
4
 
Thus, the current UK government places greater weight on the distinction between benefits 
available to families with one or more individuals in paid work and benefits available to 
families without individuals in paid work, than on the classic distinction between social 
assistance and social insurance benefits.
5 If one follows this line of thought, then, arguably, 
HB and CTB should be treated differently from IS and income-based JSA, because 
employment status is not used to assess eligibility.  
 
This is not a decisive argument however. There are merits to retaining a definition of social 
assistance benefits that accords with the classic definition, if only because this may facilitate 
cross-national comparability of analysis – we note that one of the purposes of our paper is to 
serve as a basis for similar studies for other countries. (Britain’s emphasis on ‘welfare to 
work’ is similar to that of the USA, but not to that of most European countries.) For example, 
although other countries besides Britain may not provide a separate system of housing 
benefits to help low income people with their housing costs, the levels of social assistance 
benefits may be set in a fashion that is intended to cover such costs. 
 
As it happens, the recipient populations receiving IS and JSA on the one hand, and HB and 
CTB on the other hand, overlap substantially, and so the choice of whether to include housing 
benefits in the definition of social assistance benefits may be of little practical importance.
6
 
There is an additional complication concerning the treatment of JSA and its predecessors. 
Before 1996, individuals with a satisfactory national insurance contribution record were 
eligible to claim Unemployment Benefit (UB) when they became unemployed, and the level 
of benefit paid was a flat-rate that was not means-tested. Unemployed individuals with an 
incomplete national insurance contribution record and a sufficiently low income were eligible 
to claim IS (on a means-tested basis). UB recipients were also eligible to claim an IS top-up if 
their total family income including UB was below the IS minimum. (This was more likely, 
the greater the number of dependents.) Because UB payments were relatively low, most 
recipients were also eligible for IS. JSA was introduced from October 1996 as a unified 
benefit for unemployed jobseekers. Contribution-based JSA is the successor to UB and 
receipt requires a satisfactory national insurance contributions record. Income-based JSA 
                                                                                                                                                        
in October 1999 and fully phased in by April 2000. WFTC was replaced by the Working Tax Credit (WTC) and 
Child Tax Credit programmes from April 2003. WTC extended eligibility to single people and to families 
without children. See Brewer and Shephard (2004) for a concise overview of the Labour government’s welfare 
to work policies and associated changes in the social security benefit system. 
4 Eligibility for Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit is assessed by local authorities. 
5 There are also benefits for individuals who are ill or injured not discussed here (see the URL cited earlier): 
Statutory Sick Pay for employees, Incapacity Benefit for those unable to work because of illness or disability 
and with a suitable national insurance contributions record, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit for those ill 
or disabled because of an accident or event that happened at work or in connection with work. 
6 In our estimation sample, 65% of the recipients of social assistance (defined as including IS or UB/JSA) are 
also receiving HB or CTB. Of those receiving HB or CTB, 61% also received social assistance benefits. 
  5rather than IS is now the means-tested benefit that is paid to low-income unemployed 
workers with insufficient national insurance contributions. It remains the case that most JSA 
recipients receive some income-based benefits. For example, according to administrative 
record data, at 1 August 2004, there were 737,000 JSA recipients in total, of whom 18% 
(136,000) received only contribution-based JSA and 82% (601,000) received income-based 
JSA, including 12,000 with underlying entitlement to contribution-based benefit.
7
 
In practice, it is difficult to reliably distinguish between receipt of contribution-based JSA 
and income-based JSA. Since JSA’s introduction, the BHPS interview has not asked 
respondents receiving JSA to distinguish between the two types for precisely this reason 
(Heather Laurie, BHPS Survey Manager, personal communication). Prior to JSA’s 
introduction, respondents were asked to say whether they were receiving UB or UB 
combined with IS, though it is unclear how accurately respondents were able to distinguish 
them. 
 
Hence, to produce a consistent longitudinal series for individuals’ social assistance benefit 
receipt from the BHPS, one must combine receipt of UB and UB/IS prior to 1996, and receipt 
of both types of JSA with receipt of IS after 1996. One cannot define social assistance in 
terms of IS alone, i.e. excluding receipt of any type of unemployment benefits, because the 
shift of unemployed jobseekers from IS to JSA in 1996 was largely administrative. And, 
whereas one might wish to include only unemployment benefits with a means-tested element 
in the definition of social assistance benefit, this is not feasible. The only way to distinguish 
the two types of JSA receipt after 1996 would be to estimate national insurance contribution 
records, and whether they were satisfactory, using the BHPS between-wave work monthly 
history data about employment spells and the interview data about earnings. Our view is that 
such estimates would be time-consuming and subject to error. In any case, the payoff from 
doing so is relatively small. As stated earlier, the vast majority of JSA recipients receive 
income-based JSA, just as a substantial fraction of UB recipients also received an IS top-up. 
We note that Hansen and Lofstrom’s (2006) analysis of the dynamics of social assistance 
receipt in Sweden also included receipt of some unemployment benefits in the definition of 
social assistance. We also observe that the DWP’s Statistical Summary of social security 
benefits has not broken down JSA recipient numbers by type of JSA since 2005. 
 
 
The time period of receipt 
 
Individuals receive benefits over periods of time. Spells may start or end on any day of the 
week, though for spells in progress, payments are made fortnightly. In any given calendar 
year, an individual may have no receipt, a single spell of receipt, or multiple spells of receipt, 
and any of these spells may overlap calendar years. Hence the ‘dynamics’ of receipt are 
potentially very complicated. Empirical work to date has taken a simpler approach. 
 
Previous analysis of social assistance receipt dynamics has mostly defined the time period of 
receipt in terms of ‘a social assistance year’. For example, in Andrén’s (2007) analysis, 
receipt in a given calendar year is based on whether the sample person received social 
assistance at least once during that year. (His data set provides no information about the 
sequence of social assistance received during the year, only the number of months.) Hansen 
and Lofstrom (2006) applied a similar definition to a different Swedish administrative data 
                                                 
7 See http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/stats_summary/Stats_Summary_dec2004_final.pdf.  
  6source: see the quotation from their paper above. And Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang’s (2006) 
definition of receipt of Canada’s Social Assistance benefit in a given year refers to receipt at 
any time during that year. In all three cases, it is apparently straightforward to characterise 
the ‘year’ over which receipt may occur. This is largely because of the nature of the data 
sources: the two Swedish studies are based on administrative record data and the SLID, used 
by Hansen and Lofstrom (2006), also utilizes administrative record linkage as the source for 
income for many respondents. 
 
Interview-based surveys like the BHPS collect benefit receipt information differently, as a 
consequence of wishing to minimize measurement error and respondent burden. At each 
BHPS interview, in the Autumn of each year, a lot of information is collected about the 
various income sources received at the time of the interview, and the corresponding amounts. 
Information about receipt of each source is also collected for each month back to the 
September of the year prior to the current survey year using the respondent’s retrospective 
recall.
8 Since the between-interview interval is not always 12 months, defining the income 
reference year in this manner ensures that all respondents are asked about all calendar 
months. But, at the same time, it also means that the retrospective benefit histories from 
successive interviews provide two reports for each of the months for which the reference 
years overlap.  
 
To create a consistent history of receipt of each individual, and hence to define receipt over 
succession of ‘social assistance years’ (as in the studies cited earlier), one has to decide how 
to handle inconsistencies in reports that arise for the overlap months. It is well known that 
such retrospective histories often show an implausible number of transitions at the ‘seam’ 
where successive histories are spliced together. There is an additional complication because, 
as we have explained, social assistance receipt should be defined in terms of whether any 
individual in a person’s benefit unit is in receipt. To do this for each ‘social assistance year’ 
requires information about receipt for every individual who was present in the respondent’s 
benefit unit within each month of the relevant year. However, for adults who left the benefit 
unit after the last interview and before the current interview, there is no history of receipt 
over the reference period prior to the current interview. (By definition, they are not 
interviewed.) Receipt over the year defined in terms of receipt by any person within the 
individual’s benefit unit may therefore be under-reported. Addressing these issues in order to 
develop a ‘social assistance year’ measure may well be possible, but would be time-
consuming. It is beyond the scope of the current project. 
 
Our proposal for this project is to define focus on receipt at the time of the annual interview, 
so that the dynamics of receipt refers to transitions on and off benefit between successive 
interviews. This not only avoids the problems of building a consistent ‘social assistance year’ 
definition but also exploits the benefit data that are measured most reliably (at the time of the 
interview). We would also point out that the definition is consistent with many studies of the 
probability of unemployment, and transitions into and out of unemployment, based on panel 
surveys: see e.g. Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) and Stewart (2007). 
 
 
                                                 
8 The sequence of questions used in the BHPS retrospective histories is: (i) did you receive source X at any time 
over the reference period; (ii) if yes, was it received in every month; (iii) if no, in which months? 
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The definition of social assistance benefit receipt is not straightforward. The choice depends 
on country-specific factors – the structure of the social security benefit system and how it has 
changed over time – and on the data sources available. What is possible with household panel 
surveys differs from what is possible with data sets built from benefit administration records. 
 
We track working age adults over time using BHPS data from survey years 1991 to 2005, 
using respondents to the original (‘Essex’) sample only.
9 An individual defined to be in 
receipt if any individual in his or her benefit unit is receiving social assistance benefits at the 
time of the BHPS interview. We define ‘social assistance benefits’ as including IS and either 
UB or JSA (of either type).  
 
 
2. Trends in receipt probabilities and annual transition probabilities 
 
In this section, we provide information about trends in receipt of social assistance and other 
related benefits from a cross-sectional perspective and then about trends in transition rates 
into and out of receipt. This sets the scene for the multivariate analysis to follow. We use the 
sample of working-age adults defined earlier (and described in more detail later on). 
Although the main focus of the paper is on social assistance benefit receipt and its trends, it is 
useful to place these in context with some comparisons with other benefits. For convenience, 
the following abbreviations and acronyms are used: 
•  SA: ‘social assistance’, meaning receipt of IS, with or without receipt of UB or JSA 
(depending on survey year), or UB/JSA without IS receipt. 
•  HA: housing benefits, meaning receipt of HB or CTB 
•  SAHA: social assistance including housing benefits, meaning receipt of SA or HA (or 
both) 
•  TC: employment-conditional tax credits of any kind, meaning receipt of Family Credit, 
Working Families Tax Credit or Working Tax Credit (depending on survey year). 
Because HA may received by those receiving employment-conditional tax credits, the 
memberships of the SAHA and TC recipient groups may overlap. 
 
All cross-sectional statistics were computed using the BHPS cross-section respondent 
weights. Longitudinal statistics such as transition probabilities were computed unweighted, as 
it is unclear in several cases what the appropriate weight would be (particular when we pool 
transitions from multiple waves) and, in any case, the BHPS longitudinal weights that are 
available at wave s for any wave s = 1–15, exist only for original sample respondents who 
were interviewed at wave 1 and every wave up to and including wave s.  
 
Breakdowns are also provided for the four principal client groups defined earlier: couples 
without children, couples with children, lone parents and singles. In the full person-wave 
sample, individuals belonging to tax units of couples with children were the most numerous 
group (41% of the sample). The next largest group of individuals belonged to childless 
couples (35%). Single childless tax units formed 19% of the sample, and lone parents 5% of 
the sample. The relatively small number of lone parents in the sample means that all 
                                                 
9 Thus, observations from the extension samples incorporated at the end of the 1990s for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland will not be used. Taking account of the differential sample inclusion probabilities would be a 
large task, beyond the scope of this project, and the number of observations in the original 1991 sample is 
relatively large in any case (see below). 
  8estimates of rates shown below should be treated with caution, especially the annual 
transition rates (for which the numbers involved are between 80 and 100). 
 
 
Trends in rates of receipt of benefits 
 
Cross-sectional trends in receipt are summarised in Figures 1–5. Apart from the rise in receipt 
at the beginning of the 1990s, when Britain was in recession, the percentage of all adults in 
receipt of SA fell gradually from a peak of around 12% in 1993 to a low of around 6% in 
2005. The proportion in receipt of SAHA was consistently 2%–3% higher than the proportion 
in receipt of SA, but followed a similar downward trend. The proportion of all adults in 
receipt of tax credits was consistently about 2% to 3% during the 1990s, until the introduction 
of WFTC in October 1999, after which the proportion in receipt rose dramatically to about 
6.6% in 2002. The proportion then rose again significantly with the extension of eligibility 
provided by the change to WTC in 2003. 
 

















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Social assistance Social assistance including housing benefits
ong couples with children (Figure 3), the SA receipt rate 
alved in 15 years from around 10% in 1992 and 1993 to just below 5% in 2005. TC receipt 
rates were about 5% during the mid-1990s but doubled at the end of the decade after the 
introduction of WFTC when there was a dramatic increase in receipt (11% were in receipt by 
2001), and there was another increase in 2003 when WTC was introduced (to over 20%). 
 
Lone parents have the highest SA receipt rates among the four client groups, but the rates for 
this group have also trended downward since the early 1990s (Figure 4). Almost 55% of lone 
parents were in SA receipt 1992–1994 but, in 2005, the rate was ‘only’ 25%. The difference 
between the rate of SA receipt and rate of SAHA receipt is also greater than for other groups 
Tax credits
 
Among couples without children (Figure 2), SA receipt rates stayed relatively low, at around 
5%, with little trend. TC receipt rates were zero until eligibility was extended to the group 
with the introduction of WTC. Am
h
  9(typica g and 
end of the period. Lone parents were one of the principal target groups for the welfare-to-
work changes in in-work benefits introduced at the end of the 1990s, and hence the sharp 
increase in TC receipt at that time. At the start of the 1990s, the proportion of lone parents 
receiving TC was around 10%; it was 35% by 2001, and reached 45% in 2005. 
 
Among single adults, the proportion receiving SA declined sharply from around 15% in 1992 
to about 8% in 2005. The proportion receiving SAHA is markedly higher, and the trend 
downward in receipt was more gradual, from around 20% in 1992 to around 17% in 2005. 
The TC receipt rate only became non-zero in 2003 with the introduction of WTC, which 
extended eligibility to this group. 
 
Figure 2. Trends in receipt of SA, SAHA, and TC: couples without children 
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Trends in annual rates of entry to and exit from social assistance benefit receipt 
Figures 6–10 show tr t. The exit rate is the 
number of individuals in receipt at survey year t–1 who are no longer in receipt at t, divided 
by the total number in receipt at t–1, and expressed as a percentage. (The persistence rate is 
one minus the exit rate.) Similarly, the entry rate is the number of individuals not in receipt at 
survey year t–1 who are in receipt at t, divided by the total number of individuals not in 
receipt at t–1, expressed as a percentage. The denominator of the entry rate calculation is 
much larger than the denominator of the exit rate calculation, with the exception of lone 
parents for whom they are of much the same order. Annual transition rates have been 
calculated even though small cell sizes mean that estimates are subject to relatively large 
sampling variability in some cases. Trends remain relatively clear despite this, however.  
 
Breakdowns by client group refer to client group membership at year t. (Breakdowns by 
group membership at t–1 led to very similar pictures.)  
 
Each of the figures that follows shows trends in annual entry and exit rates for SA. A 
downward trend in the cross-sectional rate of receipt of social assistance – as demonstrated 
earlier for most groups – may reflect an upward trend in the exit rate (decline in the retention 
rate) or a downward trend in entry rates. We show that it is the latter which appears to be the 
main influence. 
 
Taking all adults together (Figure 6) shows that the decline in cross-sectional receipt rates 
reflects a downward trend in entry rates: the fall in the entry rate is sufficiently large that it 
offsets the decline in the exit rate over the same period. However the decline in the entry rate 
stopped in around 2000, and the rate is relatively constant thereafter. Illustrating these 
 
ends in annual transition rates into and out of receip
  12changes, note e waves are 
pooled (t–1 corresponding to waves 1–9), and 29% for transitions pooled from years 
thereafter. The  a whole, the 
exit rate is 34% and the entry rate 2.4%. 
 
For childless couples (Figure 7), and couples with children (Figure 8), much the same story 
can be told. The decline in the cross-sectional rate of receipt arises from a declining entry 
rates offsetting declining exit rates, and the trends levelled off from around 2000. (Note the 
relatively large fluctuations in the exit rate for childless couples, related to small sample 
numbers.) 
 
For lone parents (Figure 9), there is marked sampling variability in both the annual entry and 
annual exit rates but, notwithstanding this, it is interesting that SA exit rates appear to rise 
slightly over time, i.e. in the opposite direction to adults in couple benefit units. The SA entry 
rate appears to decline over the period as a whole, and its impact on the cross-sectional 
proportion in receipt is reinforced by rising exit rate. For single adults, exit rates were fairly 
constant between 1991 and 2005, whereas the entry rate declined over time but the rate of 
decline was slower in the 2000s than in the 1990s. 
 
The pattern of trends in SA entry and exit transition probabilities raises interesting questions 
about what determined them. The change in the entry rate at the end of the 1990s might 
suggest that the reforms of the benefit system and other New Labour policies introduced at 
around that time might have been responsible. However there is no sharp correspondence 
between the dates of the introduction of major reforms like WFTC in 1999 and changes in 
transition probabili or single adu s as 
well as for families with en who were the 
principal targets of es between trends 
in transition rates and  a number 
of reforms with different impacts on different groups. (We offer further cautionary words 
about the identification of causal explanations below.) 
 
That said, one might expect the introduction of WFTC to reduce SA entry rates on the 
grounds that, if successful, people who lose their job would be less likely to take up SA 
benefits because the income from getting a new job was now boosted by WFTC. On similar 
grounds, one might expect the introduction of WFTC to raise exit rates from SA because 
WFTC made work more attractive compared to not working. An argument to the contrary is 
that the changing entry rates also lead to changes in the composition of the SA recipient 
population. Thus there may be a decline in the exit rate, reflecting a type of ‘creaming off’. 
I.e. it may be that as the fraction of the population receiving SA declined, the people who did 
receive SA were more likely to have characteristics associated with lower exit rates, other 
things equal. Indeed we observe the SA exit rate declining for all client groups apart from 
lone parents, for whom it rose. Petrongolo (2007) discusses the impact of the introduction of 
JSA in October 1996, including the more stringent job search conditions imposed on 
claimants relative to the previous system. She suggests that the reforms increased the number 
of non-employed people who were not claiming benefits but did not clearly increase the job-
finding rate. (Some may have moved to other benefits such as incapacity benefits rather than 
SA.) In Figure 6, an association between the timing of JSA introduction and SA entry rates is 
hard to discern, however. 
 
 that the SA annual exit rate is 37% if transitions from the first nin
 corresponding entry rates are 3.2% and 1.6%. For the period as
lt ties. Also, changes occurred for childless couples and f
 children, and it was lo e families with childr w incom
 the policies. In part, the lack of clear cut correspondenc
 the timing of reforms may simply reflect the combination of
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  163. Multivariate modelling approaches  
 
There are two main approaches to modelling benefit dynamics using multivariate methods: 
hazard or duration models using data about spell lengths, or models of annual probabilities of 
entry to and exit from receipt (‘transition probability’ models). As explained earlier, it is not 
feasible within the scope of the current project to derive satisfactory data about spell lengths 
f social assistance benefit receipt. We therefore focus on models of annual transition 
ynamics in general and transition probabilities in 
particular: 
•  Basic model erogen  dependence;  
dogenous switching models with unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence; and 
•  Lagged dependent variable models with unobserved heterogeneity 
(‘dynamic
 use linear probability models of 
5). For an application of their methods to benefit dynamics among 
it
i, and uit is a ‘white noise’ error term, with mean zero and uncorrelated with Xit. One can 




A model of whether someone is receiving social assistance benefit at a point in time is an 
example of a model with a binary dependent variable. Three main types of models have been 
used in related contexts to examine d
s with no allowance for unobserved het eity or state
•  En
and state dependence 
 random effects probit models’). 
We discuss the models in turn.  
 
Each of three model types makes particular assumptions about the nature of the dynamic 
process, and specific distributional assumptions. Another way of incorporating greater 
exibility and minimizing distributional assumptions is to fl
receipt dynamics, estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments estimators proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and others. See Stewart (2007) for an application to the 
dynamics of individuals’ unemployment status. Because we wish to focus on the types of 
models most commonly applied to social assistance dynamics in the past, and because of the 
limited resources available for the current project, we do not discuss linear probability models 
of dynamics further.  
 
 
Basic transition rate models 
 
The pioneering application of the basic transition rate models to benefit dynamics was by 
oskin and Nold (197 B
British lone mothers, see Böheim, Ermisch, and Jenkins (1999). Although these models are 
no longer the models of choice, they provide a useful reference point for the more 
sophisticated types of model. 
 
The processes of entry to and exit from receipt are modelled separately. For those that are not 
in receipt in the base period (call it t–1), there is a model for the probability that an individual 
moves from non-receipt at time t–1 to receipt at time t (the entry probability). And for those 
that are in receipt at t–1, there is a model for the probability of moving from receipt at t–1 to 
non-receipt at t (the exit probability).  
 
Suppose the latent entry probability, r*it, is a linear function of characteristics: 
r*it  = β′Xit  + uit   (1)
where subscript i indexes individuals, X  is a vector of characteristics associated with person 
  17time among the explanatory variables in Xit. An entry to receipt is observed if r
*
it > 0 and is 
zero otherwise.  
 
The latent exit probability, q*it is specified analogously: 
q*it = α′Zit  + vit (2)
rrors are assumed to be 
rved entry and exit rates rit and qit are at constant ‘steady state’ levels ri 
nd qi (the time subscript is no longer relevant). The probability of being in SA receipt in any 
receipt of social 
i i i eone beginning a 
not in fact constant over time. They help 
l in numerical terms how the benefit dynamics process differs between individuals with 
ent sets of char
 
 
haracteristics (the elements of X  and Z ). Once observed characteristics have been 
he 
experience of social assistance receipt may have an independent ‘scarring effect’ – past 
                                                
where Zit is a vector of characteristics for individual i (which, again, may include functions of 
calendar time), and vit is a white noise error term, with mean zero and uncorrelated with Zit. 
The  β and α are vectors of parameters, to be estimated, which capture the relationship 
between characteristics and transition probabilities. Estimation of each model is 
straightforward using e.g. either a standard logit estimator (if the errors are assumed to be 
ogistically distributed) or a standard probit estimator (if the e l
normally distributed). 
 
The major advantages of this modelling approach are that it is easy to estimate and it 
straightforward to interpret the estimated parameters. In particular, Boskin and Nold (1975) 
derived a number of expressions that usefully describe the process of benefit dynamics. 
uppose that the obse S
a
given year, equivalently the expected proportion of time in which i is in 
ssistance, is r/(r + q). The mean duration of a spell of SA receipt for som a
spell is 1/qi years, and the mean duration of a spell of SA non-receipt for someone leaving 
receipt is 1/ri years. The corresponding median spell lengths are –log(2)/log(1–qi) years and –
log(2)/log(1–ri) years. The expected turnover rate is the expected proportion of time spent in 
SA receipt multiplied by the exit rate. Equivalently it is the number of years in which there is 
a transition between receipt and non-receipt, expressed as a fraction of total time. The higher 
the turnover rate, the lower is the regularity of receipt. These expressions are useful for 
nterpretative purposes even if transition rates are  i
revea
differ acteristics. 
The basic transition probability model incorporates several important simplifications that ease 
estimation. The first is that there is no persistent unobserved individual heterogeneity in 
transition probabilities.
10 That is, all individual differences are encapsulated by observed
c it it
controlled for, there is no association between unobserved factors determining exit rates and 
unobserved factors determining exit rates. According to (1), the predicted SA entry 
probability is simply Φ(β′Xit) in the probit case and, according to (2), the predicted SA exit 
probability is simply Φ(α′Zit). (Φ(.) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution.) 
 
Second, receipt probabilities do not depend directly on past receipt. Persistence in receipt 
over time is assumed to be due to persistence in observed characteristics: the predicted SA 
persistence probability is 1–Φ(α′Zit) in the probit case. The alternative hypothesis is that t
 
10 In addition, the unobservable error terms at t for each individual, u it and vit are assumed to be neither 
correlated with their past values or with each other. Use of cluster-robust standard errors (where the clusters 
refer to groups of observations for each individual) can help mitigate problems arising if these assumptions do 
not hold. 
  18recipients may have greater chances of being current recipients, other things being equal. 
reated as exogenously given. Put differently, among the 
individuals found to be in receipt in the base  ne might expect an over-representation of 
Following Cappellari t the latent probability
ceiving social assistance in year t, p*it, is characterised by  
ow individuals, and not benefit units 
ver time, we would emphasise that the individual-specific effect is precisely that – it is not a 
g to whether the individual was in 
receipt at t–1 (yit–1 = 1) or not (yit–1
an (1981). 
The latent receipt propensity at t–1,  terised by: 
it–1 µi) plus an orthogonal white noise 
rd normal, so that the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 
 parameterised by the cross-equation correlation, ϕ (given the necessary normalisations of 
This is the situation known as ‘state dependence’.
11  
 
Third, and related, no account is taken of ‘initial conditions’ – whether or not an individual is 
in receipt or not in the base year is t
year o
individuals with unobserved characteristics associated with higher chances of being a 
recipient. Using this selected sample may yield biased estimates of the transition probabilities 
among the population.  
 
The two types of model discussed next address these issues in different ways. Common to 
both approaches, however, is that they model the probability of receipt at t rather than the 
probability of making a transition between times t–1and t, and the implications for transition 
probabilities are derived indirectly. 
 
 
Endogenous switching models 
 
 and Jenkins (2004, 2008), suppose tha  of 
re
p*it  =  [(yit–1)γ1′  +  (1–yit–1)γ2′]Zit–1  + εit;  εit  = τi  +  ζit (3)
where γ1 and γ2, are vectors of parameters to be estimated, Zit–1 is a vector of observed 
characteristics at t–1,
12 and the composite error term εit is the sum of an individual-specific 
effect (τi) plus an orthogonal white noise error (ζit). The τi term allows for persistent 
unobserved heterogeneity. (Because we can only foll
o
benefit-unit-specific effect.) An individual is observed to be in receipt at t if p*it > 0, in which 
case yit = 1, and a non-recipient otherwise (yit = 0). Thus the impact of explanatory variables 
on current receipt status may differ (‘switch’) accordin
 = 0). 
 
There is a second equation for receipt status in the base year. This describes ‘initial 
conditions’ using a reduced-form ap l gous to that proposed by Heckm proach, ana o
p* , is charac it–1
p*it–1  =  β′Xit–1 + uit–1; vit–1  = µi + δit–1 ;   (4)
where Xit–1 is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters, and the composite 
rror term v  is the sum of an individual-specific effect ( e
error (δit–1).  
 
The model specification is completed by assuming that the composite error terms εit and vit–1 
are distributed bivariate standa
is
                                                 
11 The most commonly-cited explanations for state dependence refer to the labour market. For example, the 
experience of social assistance benefit receipt may change individuals’ preferences for and attitudes to paid 
work (cf. the culture of poverty hypothesis extensively discussed particularly in the USA), or employers might 
treat social assistance receipt as a adverse signal of a potential worker’s qualities. See e.g. Arulampulam, Booth, 
and Taylor (2000) and Arulampalam, Gregg, and Gregory (2001). 
12  Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) used lagged values as explanatory variables, but this is not essential. 
Contemporaneous values, i.e. Zt rather than Zt–1 could also be used.  
  19the variances of the composite error to equal one). This correlation is the covariance between 
the individual-specific error components: ϕ  ≡ corr(vit-1, εit) = cov(ηi, τi). If ϕ  = 0, the 
switching term in (3), y atter for the estimatio
Transition probabilities c e exit rate from receipt is
Φ2(γ1′Zit–1, β′Xit–1; ϕ) 
it–1) =  
Φ(β′Xit–1) 
(5)
it–1, is exogenous: initial conditions do not m n of 
the current receipt probability. In general, however, with ϕ  ≠ 0, initial conditions do matter: 
hence the ‘endogenous switching’ label for the model. If ϕ = 0, then one is back to the Boskin 
Nold model of the previous subsection. 
 
an be derived from the model. Th  one 
minus the probability of remaining in receipt (sit), i.e. one minus the probability of being in 
receipt at t, conditional on being in receipt at t–1. The receipt entry rate, eit, is the probability 
of being in receipt at t, conditional on not being in receipt at t–1. Expressions for these 
probabilities are given, respectively, by: 
sit  ≡  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 1, Zit–1, X
and  
Φ2(γ2′Zit–1, –β′Xit–1; –ϕ) 
eit ≡  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 0, Zit–1, Xit–1)  =  
Φ(–β′Xit–1) 
(6)
where Φ2(.) is the cumulative density functions of the bivariate standard normal distribution. 
With expressions for these probabilities, one can derive the ‘Boskin-Nold’ expressions 
describing the process of benefit dynamics that were mentioned earlier in the context of the 
basic transition rate model (Cappellari and Jenkins 2004). 
 
State dependence refers to the extent to which the chances of receiving social assistan
differ according to whether  d at t–1, while controlling for the 
ce at t 
e dependence may be 
 individual, the difference between the predicted 
probabili ility of receipt 
ross all 
um, observations on a large 
anner that takes account of this aspect – what is known as 
social assistance was receive
ved. The degree of stat effects of heterogeneity, observed and unobser
summarised by calculating, for each
ty of receipt conditional on receipt and the predicted probab




The endogenous switching model addresses the three shortcomings of the basic model and, in 




stimation of the endogenous switching model requires, at minim E
number of individuals for a pair of successive years (t–1 and t), as for the basic model. 
Typically however sample sizes for a single pair of years are relatively small – the advantage 
of a long run of panel data is that it provides multiple pairs of base and current years. Both 
this model and the basic model use these multiple year-pairs by pooling them. This raises no 
additional issues for the basic model because of the strong assumptions incorporated in its 
specification. Pooling does raise issues for the estimation of the endogenous switching model. 
The observations in the pooled data set are not independently distributed: because the data set 
contains repeated observations on the same individual, the common individual-specific 
unobserved error components induce cross-observation correlations and thence biased 
estimates of standard errors. Econometricians usually recommend handling this issue by 
stimating the model in a m e
                                                 
13 The calculation of individual-specific probability differences (which are then averaged) ensures that 
individual heterogeneity is controlled for. 
14 For an application, see Cappellari and Jenkins (2008). 
  20‘integrating out e ying this procedu  
estimation of en e r the number of waves 
 more processes that are modelled. In the light of this, Cappellari and 
Jenkins (2004, 2008) propose that, instead of  control 
for the effects of  b estimator.  
below. 
et  
y contrast with the endogenous switching model, all the effects of receipt at t–1 (state 
yit–1) 
ve) the value of λ, the greater the 
e in benefit receipt probabilities. As with the endogenous switching 
dual heterogeneity is characterised by a fixed individual-specific 
’ the individual-sp cific effect. The feasibility of appl
dogenous switching models declines rapidly, the gr ate
re to
of data used, and the
using a model-based approach, analysts 
cross-observation correlations using a cluster-ro ust 
 
A feature of the Cappellari-Jenkins approach of pooling transitions is that the same initial 
conditions specification is used for every year t–1 forming part of every year t–1-year t 
transition pair. The term ‘initial conditions’ is therefore perhaps a misnomer in this context, 
and arguably should be reserved for the first year of a complete sequence of observations for 
a given individual rather than the first year in each transition pair.  
 
Labels aside, observe that statistical identification of the parameters of the endogenous 
switching model – other than by appeal to functional form – requires the availability of 
variables among the regressors (Xt–1) in the base year receipt probability equation that do not 




Lagged dependent variable models (dynamic random effects probit models) 
 
A ‘lagged dependent variable’ approach is one employed for the analysis of social assistance 
dynamics by Andrén (2007), Hansen, Lofstrom (2006), and Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang 
(2006). The approach has also been used to study the dynamics of unemployment by e.g. 
Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) and Stewart (2007). Biewen (2004) also used the 
approach, and extensions of it, to study poverty dynamics. Econometricians refer to the 
model as a dynamic random effects probit model.  
 
L
p*it  =  γ′Zit  + λyit–1  + τi + ζit;   t = 2, …, Ti (7)
describe the latent probability of social assistance receipt in each year of the sequence of Ti 
years for which an individual is observed in the panel, excluding the first year (t = 1). An 
individual is observed to be in receipt, yit = 1, in year t if p*it > 0 and yit = 0 otherwise.  
 
B
dependence) are characterised through the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (
 hence our label for the model. The larger (more positi –
degree of state dependenc
odel, unobserved indivi m
component (τi) and a white noise error component (ζit), where the error terms are 
uncorrelated with each other and with the explanatory variables included in Zit. The errors are 
each assumed to have a mean of zero and be normally distributed (so it is a probit model), 
with the variance of εit normalised to be one, and variance of τi estimated from the data.
15  
                                                 
15 Although normality is the most commonly used assumption concerning the distribution of the error 
components, some authors have considered instead discrete mass point distributions: see e.g. Hansen, Lofstrom, 
and Zhang (2006), and Stewart (2007). Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) used a random effects logit specification 
rather than a random effects probit one. There have also been extensions of the model that allow for an 
autocorrelated error structure for the error term ζit (Andrén 2007, Stewart 2007) or unrestricted error structure 
(Andrén 2007). 
  21 
The standard random effects model assumes that the unobserved individual-specific 
components are uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables. We follow Mundlak 
(1978) and Chamberlain (1984), and a number of authors since, in allowing for correlations 
between ui and Zit by supposing that 
τi  =  ξ′ i Z  + ui   (8)
where ui is distributed N(0, σu
2) and is assumed independent of Zit and ζit for all persons and 
time periods. The  i Z  may be defined in several ways – we follow the common practice of 
defining them as the longitudinal average for each individual of each characteristic within the 
ρ = corr(ui + ζit, ui + ζis )=  σu  / (1 + σu ).  (9)
 
g the 
of observations for each yi1 is 
dependent of ui. If receipt in the initial year is correlated w l-
n the error  he lagg  
hes to handling endogenous initial conditions, of which the most 
n (1981). The receipt equatio  the first
pproximation as  
p
*
i1 = π′Xi1  +  vi
s standard normal and correlated with τi but not with 
onal projecti  on τi:  
i + ζi1. 
ividual specific effects in equations (7) and (8) implies that the 
in order to
n estimator is typically done by ‘integrating 
vector Zit (with the exception of intrinsically time-varying variables like age).
16 Intuitively, 
differences in longitudinal averaged characteristics are informative about underlying 
individual-specific characteristics, so that the individual differences that are left (ui) may be 
more plausibly supposed to be independent of observed characteristics. For brevity in 
notation, we subsume the time-averaged variables into the vector Zit henceforth. 
 
The model assumes that the correlation between the composite errors from any two years t 
and s, t ≠ s, is the same for any t, s = 2, …, Ti:  
2 2
As with the endogenous switching m
‘initial conditions’ of the sequence 
odel, there is an issue for estimation concernin






ed dependen ecific effect, a correlation is induced betwee
variable in (7), leading to bias in parameter estimates.  
 
 are several approac
  t
There
popular is that proposed by Heckma
specified using a reduced-form linear a
n for  year is 
(10)
where vi is assumed to be distributed a
ζit. Such a correlation is typically modelled as an orthog on of vi
vi  = θτ (11)
The presence of correlated ind
initial period equation must be modelled jointly with the dynamic equ
onsistent maximum likelihood estimators. 
ation   obtain 
c
 
stimation of the full model using the Heckma E
out’ the individual-specific error term from the likelihood function using quadrature methods 
or by using maximum simulated likelihood methods. We use the latter: see Appendix A for 
discussion of software issues. 
 
There are other estimators of the full model that do not rely on such computationally 
intensive techniques. Orme (1997, 2001) suggested a two-step procedure in the spirit of 
Heckman’s (1979) methods for corrections for sample selection. Orme noted that if the 
                                                 
16 Neither Andrén (2007) or Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang (2006) appear to have used the Mundlak-
Chamberlain approach. 
  22individual-specific random effect is factorised into orthogonal components ui = δηi + wi, so 
that equation (7) becomes  
p*    =   γ′Z   + λy   + δη + w  +  ε (7′)
accounting for initial conditions that is increasingly used is the 
likelihood estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005). Rather than 
it it it–1 i i it
and if one can control for the presence of the ηi term in the equation, then the initial condition 
issue no longer applies. Orme suggests accounting for ηi using a generalised error term 
derived from the initial condition equation. The generalised error is defined as  
E(ηi | yi1)  =  kiφ(π′Xi1)/Φ(kiπ′Xi1),    (12)
where ki = 2yi1 – 1, and φ(.) is the standard normal density function. The derivation relies on 
an assumption that the correlation between τi and yi1 is relatively ‘small’. Moreover, there is a 
potential problem because the generalised error is heteroscedastic. However, Orme provided 
Monte Carlo evidence suggesting that the estimator performed relatively well. So, too does 
he work of Arulampalam and Stewart (2008).   t
 
Another approach to 
onditional maximum  c
modelling the joint distribution of the sequence of binary receipt indicators from the initial 
one to the final one conditioning on the set of explanatory variables, Wooldridge suggested 
modelling the distribution of the binary receipt indicators from ti = 2, …, Ti, and conditioning 
on the set of explanatory variables and the binary receipt indicator for the initial year. 
Wooldridge proposed modelling the distribution of τi conditional on yi1 and either Zi = (Zi1, 
Zi2, …, ZiT), or  i Z . His model for the individual-specific component (abstracting from  i Z  
already incorporated using the Chamberlain-Mundlak specification) can be written as:  
τi  =  a0  +  a1 yi1  +  ui + ζit,  (13)
so that the dynamic equation becomes 
p*it  =  γ′Zit  + λyit–1 + ξ′ i Z   + a0  +  a1 yi1  +  ui  +  ζit;   t = 2, …, Ti.  (7′′)
By contrast with the Heckman and Orme approaches, the initial state is not modelled. 
 
As Stewart (2007, p. 516) points out, ‘[t]he estimator can be viewed as simply using a 
different approximation which has computational advantages’. Those advantages are that the 
odel can be estimated using standard random-effects probit software modules (see 
mpalam and Stewart (2008).  








unbalanced panels.  
T
probabilities for ind
the model implies that the SA persistence rate is:  
m
Appendix A). There is some evidence that the Heckman, Orme and Wooldridge estimators 
lead to similar estimates: see Arula
 
The Orme and Wooldridge estimators were de
sequence of observations is the length for each individual (Ti = T, all i). However, both may 
e applied to unbalanced panels assuming that sample dropout is ignorable – the 
bservable determinants of attrition are not correlated with the unobservables determining 
 receipt. This assumption is ubiquitous in this context and we use it too. We also note that 
n where researchers have found that sample dropout is non-ignorable when modelling of 
our market dynamics, the impact of attrition is small (see Cappellari and Jenkins 2008 and 
 references cited therein). To check the robustness of our results, we report estimates 
ived using the Heckman, Orme, and Wooldridge estimators, and using both balanced and 
 
he dynamic random effects probit model may be used to provide estimates of transition 
ividuals of different types by conditioning on receipt status at t–1, since 
  23sit  ≡  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 1, Zit) = Φ( (γ′Zit  + λ)/(1–ρ)
0.5 )  (14)
and SA entry rate is 
ne assumes SA receipt at t–1 and the 
ther assumes non-receipt, the APE and PPR are natural measures of the magnitude of state 
As
pro n and Orme estimators is best secured with suitable 
the
the nctional form. Interestingly, 
ass
me












We  up to a 
maximum of 15 observations per individual on social assistance benefit participation and 
other variables. At least two consecutive waves of data are required to estimate any of the 
models of dynamics. Individuals may join the panel at wave 1 (survey year 1991) if they are 
original sample respondents.
19 They join the panel at later waves if they are the children of 
                                                
eit ≡  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 0, Zit)  =  Φ( (γ′Zit )/(1–ρ)
0.5 ).  (15)
From these expressions, one may also derive ‘Boskin-Nold’ expressions describing the 
process of benefit dynamics: see Section 5. Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang (2006) estimate 
models of SA receipt separately for Canadian provinces, and report model-based estimates of 
transition probabilities for a ‘representative’ individual in each province. Arulampalam, 
Booth, and Taylor (2000), and Stewart (2007) also report estimates of ‘average’ sit and eit, 
together with the associated average partial effect (APE) and predicted probability ratio 
(PPR). Their method involves computing sit and eit for each individual in the sample, and then 
averaging each probability over all individuals. The difference between the averages is the 
APE; their ratio is the PPR. Since the calculations of sit and eit control for observed and 




 with the endogenous switching models, identification of the dynamic random effects 
bit model estimated using the Heckma
instruments for initial conditions – explanatory variables that explain receipt probabilities in 
 initial year but which do not also explain the current year receipt probability. Without 
se, identification of the model relies on non-linearities in fu
Andrén (2007) and Hansen, Lofstrom and Zhang (2006) appear to rely on functional form 
umptions for identification – instruments for the initial conditions equation are not 
ntioned.
17 Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) and Stewart (2007) use pre-sample 
ormation a
and so do we. 
Overall, there is little to choose between lagged dependent variable and endogenous 
itching models taking into account both flexibility of specification and ease of estimation. 
wever, lagged dependent variable models have been the models most commonly used in 
lications to social assistance benefit dynamics, and also used to study related phenomena 
h as unemployment and poverty dynamics. So, they are the ones we use in this research. 
ample selection criteria and explanatory variables 
ple selection criteria 
 have access to fifteen waves of BHPS data,
18 so our analysis data set may contain
 
17 Biewen (2004) and Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) rely on a version of the Wooldridge estimator. Because 
initial conditions are not modelled, instruments are not required.  
18 See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/ for BHPS documentation and information about how to access the 
data. 
19 We do not use observations from the extension samples for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. See n. 9. 
  24original sample members and become respondent adults in their own right, or join (and 
remain with) a household containing an original sample respondent e.g. through marriage to 
that respondent. We track individuals from when they are first observed as BHPS respondents 
ntil the first wave at which they drop out of the panel, either completely non-responding or 
 and 
ot in full-time education (see earlier), and not missing data on some important explanatory 
tions for 9,036 adults. The 
inimum value of Ti is 2 and the maximum value is 15. The majority of the sequences start at 
observations 
u
with item non-response of sufficient degree that the individual’s data cannot be used for 
estimation. If individuals rejoin the panel at some later wave, leading to gaps in benefit 
receipt sequences, we exclude them because taking account of intermittent participation 
complicates modelling substantially (especially initial conditions). Thus, we focus on what is 
known as the ‘absorbing attrition’ case. 
 
The sample used for the empirical analysis was restricted to individuals of working age
n
variables. The sample selection criteria, applied sequentially, are summarized in Table 2, 
together with the numbers of person-year observation excluded by each selection. The basic 
estimation sample comprises 75,988 person-wave observa
m
wave 1 (5,067 out of 9,036, i.e. 56% of all adults in the sample), but there are sequences that 
begin at each subsequent wave as well (roughly 200–300 adults each year). 
 
Table 2 
Sample selection criteria and sample numbers 
Sample selection criteria (sequential)  Number of person-year 
 Excluded  Remaining 
Full 
ouseholds in the original 1991 sample, or in split-off 
187, BHPS sample (15 waves; all individuals in      563
h
households in later waves 
Less    
Missing benefit unit type information  109  187,454
Dependent children  43,184  144,270
Respondent aged < 25 or > 59   53,332  90,938
Spouse (if present) aged < 25 or > 59   4,926  86,012
Adults in benefit units with at least 1 full-time student  1,322  84,690
Missing unemployment rate information  17  84,673
aps in response sequence  G
R
6,270  78,403
espondent at only  2,415  75,988
The analysis subsample
one wav
 of 75,9 8
e 
 person-wave observations relates to 9,036 adu 8 lts. 
 
nbalanced versus balan
nel reduces sample numbers 
ubstantially, thereby reducing the precision of parameter estimates, other things being equal. 
Another problem is that a balanced sample may be a non-random sub-sample of all 
respondents (unobserved characteristics associated with retention may be associated with the 
unobserved characteristics that raise the probability of receiving social assistance). We work 
with an unbalanced sample for most analysis but check robustness by re-estimating some 
models using a fifteen-wave balanced panel. With our unbalanced panel we are able to cover 




There are 9,036 adults in our analysis data set but only 22% of them – 1,996 adults 
contributing 29,940 person-wave observations – were respondents at all fifteen waves. 
Clearly, restricting analysis to a fifteen-wave balanced pa
s
  25system and, in respect of attrition, we are less selective. Our practice differs from that of 
other researchers, however. 
 
The social assistance dynamics papers by Andrén (2007), and Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang 
(2006), use balanced panels. Hansen and Lofstrom (2006, p.7) state explicitly that they used a 
balanced panel to derive the estimates reported, but also say that they estimated the model 
with an unbalanced panel as a sensitivity check. Our fifteen-year period is longer than in 
these studies – 10 years in the Swedish studies, and six years for the Canadian one. Stewart’s 
(2007) authoritative study of individual unemployment dynamics used a balanced six-wave 
panel of 3,060 adults drawn from the BHPS waves 1–6. Biewen (2004) used a balanced panel 
of 2,427 men from the German Socio-Economic Panel, survey years 1991–2001. 
Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) used an unbalanced panel from waves 1–5 of the 





Our explanatory variables other than lagged SA receipt status – i.e. the measures of 
characteristics that comprise Zit – are of four main types. First, there are individual-level 
variables, which summarize characteristics of the respondent, plus his or her spouse (if 








account of spousal characteristics as well as those of respondents. And because our data span 
 longer time period, we give greater attention to accounting for time trends. 
he individual-level variables used to summarise the characteristics of a respondent, and of a 
health problems. Respondents are asked whether they have any of 13 health problems or 
value for each adult within the same benefit unit. Third, there are the longitudinally-averaged 
iables derived for each individual from the first two types of variable, and used 
im lement the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach. Fourth and finally, there are variables taking 
ount of variations in receipt probabilities with calendar time that are not captured by other 
iables.  
 
e set of variables used is similar to those used in previous studies of social assistance 
amics. The main differences arise partly as a consequence of our differing samples. 




spouse (if present) are as follows: 
•  Age (in years) as at 1
st December of the year prior to the survey year. 
•  Sex: whether the respondent is female or not. 
•  Educational qualifications. We distinguish between four categories: none, low, high, and 
missing. Low refers to having CSE(s) and/or O-levels; high refers to having A-level(s) or 
higher qualifications such as a degree. There is a non-negligible fraction of respondents 
with missing data on educational qualifications (see below). These are mostly respondents 
for whom only a proxy interview was gained – there was sufficient information derived 
about other characteristics of the individual from the proxy respondent so that the 
individual could be included in the sample. The missing qualifications indicator is better 
interpreted as a control for response propensity than as a measure of educational 
qualifications. 
•  Health problems (respondent only): whether someone stated that s/he experiences any 
  26disabilities listed on a showcard.
20 We used this measure rather than any other of the 
health measures in the BHPS as only this one was available at each interview waves 1–15. 
 
We also considered ethnic minority group membership as an explanatory variable, but have 
th was dropped after preliminary analysis indicated it was never statistically significant. 
d any differentiation between legally marriages and 
cohabiting unions. (Assessments of re  
es of partnership as ‘married’. 
 
The benefit unit-
 than five years. 
  Benefit unit type: binary indicators for whether a single adult, couple (legally married or 
sure of local labour market 
tightness. The series is not entirely comparable over time because of changes in 
definitions during the 1990s (consistent series were used for waves 1–5 and for waves 6–
pact on estimates (see also the trends 
reported in Table 3). Another potential problem is that data could not be matched in for a 
g) were dropped: see Table 2. 
chosen not to, primarily because the large number of such groups meant that there were small 
cell size problems. Cell size problems cannot be overcome by simply pooling groups. A 
simple distinction between, UK and foreign born, or between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’, say, 
does not do justice to the large degree of diversity between the many groups in the UK. There 
is a large number of non-white groups (each with very few representatives in the BHPS 
sample), and they have diverse experiences. Moreover many members of ethnic minority 
groups are UK-born and UK citizens. (And a number of ‘white’ people are not.) Spouse’s 
heal
For the same reason, we also droppe
 benefit eligibility also make no distinction.) For b vity,
we shall refer to both typ
level variables are as follows: 
•  Presence of dependent children in the benefit unit: binary indicators for whether the 
number of children present is zero, one, two, or three or more, and whether the age of the 
youngest child is less
•
cohabiting), or a lone parent unit. These variables can also be interpreted as characterizing 
interactions between marital status and presence of children. 
•  Region: whether the respondent lives in inner or outer London. There are 18 regions that 
can be distinguished in the BHPS but we focus on differences between London and the 
rest of the country. This was the key distinction that was apparent from preliminary 
analyses. 
•  Housing tenure: whether the respondent lived in owner-occupied housing rather than 
some other tenure. 
•  Unemployment rate (%). Our measure is the ratio of the number of unemployed to the 
number in the labour force for the respondent’s travel-to-work area (TTWA) at the time 
of the interview, derived from JUVOS sources.
21 This is a mea
15) but the changes do not appear to have had an im
minority of cases. To address this issue, we used respondent-specific linear interpolations 
for wave t based on the respondent-specific rates for wave t–1 and wave t+1. For the cases 
remaining with missing unemployment rate data, we imputed values using the average 
rate for the respondent’s region for that survey year. Nineteen cases for whom no 
imputation was possible (data on region was missin
                                                 
20 The problems or disabilities refer to: (1) Problems or disability connected with: arms, legs, hands, feet, back, 
or neck (including arthritis and rheumatism); (2) Difficulty in seeing (other than needing glasses to read normal 
size print); (3) Difficulty in hearing; (4) Skin conditions/allergies; (5) Chest/breathing problems, asthma, 
bronchitis; (6) Heart/blood pressure or blood circulation problems; (7) Stomach/liver/kidneys; (8) Diabetes; (9) 
Anxiety, depression or bad nerves; (10) Alcohol or drug related problems; (11) Epilepsy; (12) Migraine or 
frequent headaches; (13) Other health problems.  
21 JUVOS: the Joint Unemployment & Vacancies Operating System Cohort (a 5% sample of all conputerised 
claims for unemployment-related benefits selected by reference to a claimants’s National Insurance Number). 
See e.g. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Analysis.asp?vlnk=224&More=Y  
  27Considered in preliminary analysis but later dropped was an indicator of whether the 
individual lived in a household containing more than one benefit unit. It was never 
atistically significant.  
e 
verages were over the Ti waves sequence for each individual. 
for each survey year in the receipt 
robability equation. Thus, equation (7) is modified to 
3 i3 4 i4 15 i15 it
st
 
We also consider whether the impact of SA receipt at t–1 differs between groups of 
respondents, i.e. whether there is heterogeneity in any potential state dependence effect. First, 
we differentiate between respondents who have been in continuous SA receipt since their 
previous interview and those in non-continuous receipt (with a spell of non-receipt after the 
previous interview and before the current interview). Second, we investigate whether 
persistence probabilities differ between lone parents and other respondents, on the grounds 
that lone parents have distinctively long spells of receipt. See Section 5 for more details. 
 
The longitudinal time-averaged variables were derived for each respondent from the 
variables described above (with the exception of age and educational qualifications). Th
a
 
Calendar time is a potentially important explanatory variable in its own right as one might 
expect the various changes made to the British social security system between 1991 and 2005 
to be reflected in the coefficients on variables summarizing the passage of time.
22 Time may 
also reflect any other calendar time-varying effect such as the business cycle (that is not 
already picked up by our measure of the local unemployment rate). In the basic models 
reported first, we simply include indicator variables 
p
 
p*it  = w3Wi3 + w4Wi4 + … + w15Wi15 + γ′Zit  + λyit–1  + τi + ζit;   t = 2, …, Ti (16)
 
where Wik, k = 2003, …, 2005, is a survey year indicator variable for person i. The reference 
year is 1992 (wave 2) and its effect is represented by the constant term included within the Zit 
vector. In this specification, the survey year variables act as intercept shifters, and fit 
variations with time that are common to both the probability of SA receipt persistence and of 
SA entry. In subsequent models, we also allow time to affect SA entry probabilities 
separately, by introducing interactions between survey year indicators and the lagged SA 
receipt indicator. (Put another way, the state dependence effect varies with survey year.) In 
this case, survey year also acts as a slope shifter as well. 
 
p*it  =   w W  + w W  + … + w W   +   γ′Z
     + (λ2Wi2 + λ3Wi3 + λ4Wi4 + … + λ15Wi15)yit–1
     + τi + ζit ;   t = 2, …, Ti
(17)
 
To anticipate some results, our final specification is a restricted version of equation (17). We 
find that it is statistically acceptable to distinguish simply between years before and after 
1998, for both intercept and slope interactions. See Section 5. 
 
                                                 
22 We should stress that our ability to conclude that the reforms caused observed changes is constrained. These 
multivariate models provide informative descriptions of benefit dynamics; they are not structural models nor 
based on a (quasi-)experimental design. Note also that policy changes may also have an impact over time by 
changing the composition of the populations at risk of entering or leaving SA receipt (the distributions of the 
explanatory variables). 
  28In common with previous literature, our explanatory variables do not include measures of 
events that might trigger moves into or out of receipt such as job loss or job gain, or a marital 
split or departure or arrival of a new born child. The appeal of including them is that they 
may help better ‘explain’ the dynamics of benefits. The problem is that the variables are 
potentially endogenous, they can only occur to some types of individual (e.g. already-married 
eople cannot get married, unemployed people cannot lose a job) and so there are issues 
mily size? If there 
re these feedback effects which are not incorporated into the model, then one can derive 
te we shall assume that feedback 
ffects can be safely ignored.   
 
We utilise as instruments for initial conditions variables that have been used in similar 
contexts, notably the modelling of individual unemployment dynamics using BHPS data by 
Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) and Stewart (2007). These are individual-specific 
variables as follows: 
•  whether or not the individual’s first labour market spell after leaving full-time education 
was a spell of employment or self-employment rather than unemployment or inactivity. 
•  binary indicators summarizing the socioeconomic group associated with the first job that 
the respondent had. We distinguished between professional and managerial, non-manual, 
manual, other (e.g. armed forces or agriculture), and ‘missing’ (the reference category). 
•  measures of the respondent’s family background, defined using respondents’ responses to 
questions asking them about their mother and their father when they (the respondents) 
were aged 14. Specifically these are a set of dummy variables summarising factors such 
as whether either or both parents were alive at that time and, if so, whether they were 
employed or not. 
 
Summary: the impact of explanatory variables on transition probabilities 
 
Consider first transition probabilities at the individual level. Supposing that the estimated 
coefficient on an variable within the characteristics vector Zit is positive (negative), then the 
effect of an increase in the value of the particular characteristic is to increase (decrease) both 
the SA entry rate eit and the SA persistence rate sit. For example, thinking about 
characteristics associated with labour market success (and hence non-receipt of SA), we 
would expect higher educational qualifications and lower unemployment rates to be 
associated with lower persistence rates and lower entry rates. Individuals with children, 
especially young children, and lone parents in particular, would be expected to have higher 
persistence rates and higher entry rates. So too would those living in rented accommodation, 
other things being equal, given the positive association between home ownership and 
affluence. (The idea is not so much that tenancy itself has an effect, but is a marker for having 
relatively low financial assets and, given the geographical concentration of much social 
housing, may also pick up adverse area effects that are not otherwise summarized by the local 
                                                
p
about how to incorporate such variables in a multivariate model and (related) point-in-time 
characteristics may already incorporate much of the variation encapsulated by these variables. 
There is also a more general question of whether the assumption of ‘strict exogeneity’ 
underlying the lagged dependent variable models holds. For example, is it appropriate to 
assume that past benefit receipt is not itself a determinant of some of the variables used to 
explain current benefit receipt, e.g. whether living as a couple or not, or fa
a
biased estimates of the impacts of explanatory variables and of the degree of state 
dependence. As in virtually all the related literature to da
23 e
 
23 See Biewen (2004) for further discussion of the strict exogeneity assumption and estimation of a model of 
poverty dynamics incorporating feedback effects. 
  29area unemployment rate.) Having controlle e and other factors, it is not obvious to us 
what the expected asso haracteristics such as 
ge, sex, and living in London relative to other areas of the country. 
hat about aggregate transition probabilities and their trends over time, as shown in Figure 6 
ities can be accounted for by the model 
if there are parame  a ed to cha for survey year 
intercept s e equation 17) which impose a temporal pattern that is common to both the 
aggregate SA ntry and ersistence rates. yi pa e ry with 
survey year is the means by which differences tem terns of entry and 
p nce re a moda hus, ion  plies e SA tence rate 
i
s  (w  + i15  +
 λ2W Wi3  i4 + … Wi15)/(
.5 ) 
(18)
and the SA entry rate
it ≡   (w3W  + w   +  /(1–ρ) (19)
I ate  w  eters mall later e 
r clin  tim stima  the  meters decline with time, the SA persistence 
rate declines over tim
 
C s i istr  of  cteris ver  among opula at risk of 
b ent exit lso explain tren aggregate transit tes. The aggregate SA 
entry rate rises or falls depending on whether there is an increase or a decrease in the 
p ion ent n-re ts w aking them relatively prone to 
en e a te SA isten e ris alls de ng on whether there is 
n increase or a decrease in the proportion of current SA recipients with characteristics 
ceipt. For example, a rise over time in the 
pr n o le with go s among SA recipients and non-
recip nts w  ex  to A  an tes over time. So would a 
secular decline in unemployme et re investigate the trends over time in 
characteristics of the SA recipient and non-recipient subsam
 
 
Explanatory variables and their tr ver tim
 
Th ns  ex ory v les for  survey , and for all survey years 
co d a n i e 3. P  show nformation for SA non-recipients (those 
at risk of entry) and panel B shows the inform for SA ients (those at risk of exit). 
Trends for the sample as a whole are very similar to those fo non-recipients because they 
co  th ity  overa lysis sa  
 
Consider non-recipients first. Panel A, part (a), shows that t rage age was 41 years, half 
were wome just one h orted a t one h roblem. About thirteen per 
cent had no educational qualificat nd a qu had on  qualifications (part b). The 
av age ouse  arou  years,  ber which reflects the fact that spouse’s 
age et t if   no  pres erwis average age is much more 
ws that almost a fifth of SA non-recipients had 
one child and another fifth had two children, and just under a fifth had a child aged less than 
five years. Four-fifths were part of a couple, some 17% were single adults and 3% were lone 
d for thes




in particular? Changes over time in transition probabil
ters that re allow nge over time. We allow 
hifts (se
 e  p  Specif ng the im
 in the 
ct of past r
poral pat
ceipt to va
ersiste  rates a ccom ted. T  equat (17) im  that th  persis
s:  
it = Φ( 3Wi3 + …  w15W   γ′Zit  
 + i2 + λ3 + λ4W  + λ15 1–ρ)
0
 is 
e  =  Φ( i3 + … 15Wi15  γ′Zit )
0.5 ). 
f estim s of the param  are s er for   survey years, SA entry and persistenc
ates de e over e. If e tes of λ para
e. 
hange n the d ibution chara tics o time   the p tions 
enefit  ry and   may a ds in  ion ra
roport  of curr  SA no cipien ith characteristics m
try. Similarly th ggrega  pers ce rat es or f pendi
a
making them relatively prone to remaining in SA re
oportio f peop od educational qualification






ends o e  
e mea  of the planat ariab each   year
mbine re show n Tabl anel A s the i
ation   recip
r SA 
mprise e major of the  ll ana mple. 
he ave
n, and   over  alf rep t leas ealth p
ions a arter  ly low
erage   for sp s was nd 32 a num
 is s o zero  there is  spouse ent (oth e the 
similar to that of the respondent). Panel (c) sho
  30parents. Just over 80% lived in owner-occupied accommodation, and one in ten lived in 
ondon, and the average local area rate was just over 5% (panel d).  
These are averages for the period as a whole  e er time.
2
Observe the upward drift in the proportion reporting a health problem (up from around 50% 
in 1 1 to a  60%  05),  arge c nges in istr f onal 
qualifications. The fraction of the le with no ed l qualifications or low
qualifications declined from around 53% in 1991 to 26% in 2005, whereas the proportion 
w h qu tions  corresp gly. T as a 
m data ducati ualifi s: this lenc roxy 
in s to tain r e rate e BH tured other  var  over 
tim  in l rea u oyment rates, whic lined  lmo
the 1990s to just over 2% in 2005. In contrast,  eans o ually e de aphic 
variables (age, number and age of children, benefit unit type) changed ve le ov e. 
 
W spect he ea discus bout the relationship between changes in the 
distribution of characteristics and t on rat ble 3 ests  SA  rates 
de  over becau the ma improv t in ed nal q catio d the 
de n local unemplo  rates. ight have been expected 
fr  inc in the alence of health problems.) T vellin  in  te of 
decline in the average local unemplo t rate a  1997 nsist th th lling 
of  dec  the S ry rate d that 
 
at as Panel A, but now calculated for 
e (much smaller) subsample of SA recipients. Compared to non-recipients and for the 
er (60% rather than 50%), and the proportion 
w ati   on  is higher (40% rather than 13% have no 
qualifications). There are also striking differences in the demography of the samples. In 
particular, a quarte re  to families with three or more children 
(c d t of re ts) and oportion with a child aged under five years is 25% 
rather than 18%. About one quarter of recipients are lone parents but only 3% of non-
re s. T opo of SA recipients living in owned accommodation averages one 
third for the period as a whole comp with 80% for non-recipients. In addition, recipients 
tend to live  s w htly hig nemployment rates than non-recipients. In sum, and 
as ted scussion, SA receipt is concentrated among individuals with 
ch isti ocia th disad arket in particular.  
 
A s tre re c ed, there are similarities and differences between SA recipients 
and non-recipients. For both groups, the prevalence of health problems rose over time, but the 
in is  for  ents (fr % to 76%, compared to from 50% to 59%). The 
proportion with no educational qualifications fell for both groups; so too did local 
un ym tes.   are so istinctive demographic trends: the proportion of 
recipients in households with children, and with young children in particular, declined over 
tim ere  lso  ked dec  the fraction of the sample who were lone parents 
(from 35% in 1991 to 18% in 2005). In part, this might be explained by a shift in low income 
families with children (and lone parents in p ular) from receipt of SA to receipt of in-
ork benefits, though observe that the decline in the fractions with children and of lone 
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24 Some of these trends may reflect a selective process of sample drop-out: for instance, respondents with low 
educational qualifications, other things equal, have a high probability of attrition. 
  31parents is relatively steady over the period, rather than changing sharply at the dates when 
ajor policies were introduced. Another marked trend among recipients is the decline in the 
 41% in 1991 to 22% in 2005. Put another 
w e as tion n  ipt and li increased (as is 
relatively well-known).  
 
With respect to the earlier discussion about the  f c  the distribution of 
c ris nel gges t tw ds i ticular help  t for the 
d in  rega  exit ver t e ri
problems, and (especially) the large rise   pro n in n ned a modation. 
T  co t w  ‘cre ’ h sis according to which the SA recipient 
population is increasingly made up of individuals least equipped for work. 
 
W  tu  these descrip tatist the  ariate  ling to investigate the 
f det g S y an rates re d
 
m
proportion living in owned accommodation, from
ay, th socia  betwee SA rece ving in social housing has 
impact o hanges in
haracte tics, Pa  B su ts tha o tren n par  may  accoun
ecline  the agg te SA  rate o ime: th se in proportion of recipients with health 
in the portio on-ow ccom
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e now rn from tive s ics to  multiv model
actors  erminin A entr d exit   in mo etail. 
  32Table 3  
Explanatory variables, means by survey year 
A on-re -yea
 







. SA n cipients (N = 70,235 person rs) 
nt cha ristics  non-reci
h 
) 
ars)  p s
l qualif





1991 39.69 0.50  0.50 0.22  1  40  0.07
None  CSE
O-le
A-le )  M
or h  
g 
  0.3 0.  
1992 40.36 0.50  0.51 0.21  9  41  0.09
1993 40.55 0.50  0.53 0.18  8  41  0.13
1994 40.56 0.50  0.52 0.17  8  44  0.11
1995 40.73 0.50  0.52 0.16  8  45  0.11
1996 40.68 0.50  0.54 0.15  9  47  0.09
1997 40.87 0.50  0.56 0.14  8  49  0.09
1998 40.96 0.50  0.56 0.13  7  50  0.09
1999 40.94 0.50  0.55 0.12  6  52  0.09
2000 41.11 0.50  0.58 0.10  5  55  0.10
2001 41.12 0.50  0.58 0.09  4  56  0.11
2002 41.12 0.50  0.60 0.08  3  57  0.12
2003 41.30 0.51  0.58 0.08  1  59  0.12
0  0.60  0.14 
2005 41.89 0.52  0.59  0.06  0.20  0.60  0.13 
0.13 0.26  0.50  0.10 
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
  0.2 0.  
2004 41.30 0.51  0.57  0.07  0.2
All 40.86  0.50  0.55 
 
(b) spouse’ cter s  (SA ents) 
Year Age    E alifications 
s chara istic  non-recipi
ducational  qu





0.25  0.32  0.03 
years) None 
vels 
1991 32.51  0.18 
1992 32.90  0.18  0.24  0.32  0.03 
0.23  0.32  0.05 
0.23  0.35  0.04 
0.23  0.35  0.05 
0.23  0.38  0.04 
0.23  0.38  0.04 
0.23  0.40  0.04 
0.21  0.41  0.04 
0.20  0.43  0.05 
0.19  0.45  0.05 
0.18  0.45  0.05 
0.17  0.47  0.05 
2004 33.03  0.16  0.48  0.05 
2005 33.67  0.05  0.16  0.48  0.06 
All 33.04  11.09 21.21  39.70  0.04 
1993 32.92  0.15 
1994 32.89  0.14 
1995 33.02  0.13 
1996 32.88  0.12 
1997 33.05  0.12 
1998 33.16  0.11 
1999 33.22  0.10 
2000 33.10  0.09 
2001 33.14  0.08 
2002 32.97  0.07 
2003 33.29  0.06 
0.05 
Spouse’s characteristics set equal to zero if no spouse. 
  33Table 3A continued 




Year  No. children in benefit unit  Youngest 
child < 5 
Benefit unit type  Co




Couple Single  w
chi
1991 0.17  0.23  0.10  0.19  0.03 0.81 0.17  0.47 
ith 
ldren 
1992 0.17  0.20  0.08  0.18  0.02 0.80 0.17  0.43 
1993 0.18  0.20  0.08  0.18  0.03 0.80 0.17  0.43 
1994 0.19  0.19  0.08  0.18  0.03 0.80 0.17  0.44 
1995 0.19  0.19  0.08  0.18  0.03 0.80 0.17  0
1996 0.18  0.20  0.08  0.17  0.03 0.80 0.17  0.43 
1997 0.18  0.19  0.08  0.17  0.03 0.80 0.18  0.42 
1998 0.19  0.18  0.08  0.18  0.03 0.80 0.17  0.42 
1999 0.18 
.43 
0.19  0.08  0.17  0.03 0.80 0.17  0.42 
2000 0.19  0.19  0.08  0.17  0.03 0.79 0.18  0.43 
0.19  0.07  0.17  0.03 0.80 0.17  0.43 





2003 0.18  0.21  0.07  0.17  0.03 0.79 0.17  0.43 
2004 0.19  0.21  0.07  0.18  0.03 0.79 0.18  0
2005 0.20  0.22  0.07  0.18  0.04 0.80 0.17  0
All 0.18 0.20  0.08  0.18 0.03  0.80  0.17 0
Children’s variables set equal to zero if no children in benefit unit. 
 







rate (%) in 
TTWA area 
1991 0.82 0.11  7.95 
1992 0.81 0.11  9.39 
2005 0.86 0.08  2.30 
1993 0.79 0.11  9.53 
1994 0.81 0.10  8.52 
1995 0.81 0.10  7.62 
1996 0.83 0.10  5.40 
1997 0.82 0.10  3.93 
1998 0.82 0.10  3.49 
1999 0.82 0.10  3.19 
2000 0.83 0.10  2.76 
2001 0.82 0.09  2.49 
2002 0.82 0.09  2.47 
2003 0.82 0.09  2.38 
2004 0.81 0.08  2.14 
All 0.82  0.10  5.01 
 
 
  34B. SA recipients (N = 5,663 person-years) 
 











1991 36.98 0.61  0.53  0.43  0.36  0.18  0.03 
1992 37.82 0.58  0.55  0.43  0.34  0.21  0.02 
0.29  0.31  0.05 
2001 40.32 0.60  0.76  0.36  0.32  0.30  0.03 
1993 38.55 0.59  0.58  0.41  0.34  0.23  0.02 
1994 39.16 0.61  0.60  0.40  0.31  0.25  0.03 
1995 38.87 0.61  0.64  0.38  0.32  0.29  0.02 
1996 39.63 0.61  0.71  0.39  0.32  0.26  0.02 
1997 39.75 0.59  0.73  0.36  0.32  0.29  0.03 
1998 39.38 0.62  0.74  0.34  0.34  0.29  0.04 
1999 39.93 0.61  0.74  0.35  0.32  0.29  0.04 
2000 39.70 0.62  0.74  0.35 
2002 41.30 0.61  0.77  0.38  0.29  0.30  0.03 
2003 41.16 0.61  0.74  0.36  0.30  0.30  0.05 
2004 40.70 0.61  0.74  0.33  0.31  0.30  0.06 
2005 41.78 0.58  0.76  0.32  0.23  0.36  0.10 
All 39.35  0.60  0.67 0.38 0.32  0.27  0.03 
 
(b) spouse’s characteristics  (SA recipients) 
Year Age    Educational  qualifications 
 (years)  None  CSE(s),  A-level(s)  Missing
O-levels  or higher 
1991 20.65  0.23  0.18  0.10  0.01 
1992 21.11  0.23  0.19  0.11  0.01 
1993 22.53  0.24  0.20  0.12  0.01 
1994 21.22  0.21  0.16  0.13  0.02 
1995 22.13  0.22  0.17  0.16  0.01 
2003 22.98  0.19  0.14  0.18  0.02 
1996 22.07  0.23  0.16  0.15  0.00 
1997 20.88  0.19  0.14  0.15  0.01 
1998 20.22  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.01 
1999 20.60  0.18  0.16  0.13  0.02 
2000 20.83  0.21  0.14  0.13  0.01 
2001 22.51  0.22  0.15  0.14  0.01 
2002 23.13  0.23  0.13  0.16  0.02 
2004 24.12  0.23  0.15  0.16  0.00 
2005 25.36  0.21  0.13  0.19  0.02 
All 21.80  21.60 16.26  13.97  0.01 
Spouse’s characteristics set equal to zero if no spouse. 
  35Table 3B continued 
 
(c) characteristics of respondent’s benefit unit (SA recipients) 
Year  No. children in benefit unit  Youngest 
child < 5 
Benefit unit type  Couple  




Couple Single  with 
ch
1991 0.24  0.26  0.21  0.35  0.29 0.55 0.16  0.41 
ildren 
1992 0.24  0.19  0.19  0.29  0.23 0.55 0.22  0.39 
1993 0.23  0.20  0.20  0.28  0.23 0.58 0.20  0.40 
1994 0.22  0.20  0.19  0.24  0.26 0.53 0.21  0
1995 0.22  0.21  0.22  0.29  0.23 
.35 
0.56 0.21  0.42 
1996 0.24  0.18  0.18  0.25  0.24 0.56 0.21  0.37 
.31 
0.19  0.18  0.16  0.17  0.18 0.59 0.23  0.36 
All 0.22 0.21  0.19  0.25 0.25  0.54  0.21 0.37 
1997 0.24  0.22  0.20  0.30  0.27 0.51 0.22  0.39 
1998 0.23  0.22  0.20  0.27  0.27 0.51 0.22  0.38 
1999 0.21  0.20  0.20  0.22  0.26 0.50 0.23  0.35 
2000 0.21  0.23  0.19  0.24  0.26 0.51 0.23  0.36 
2001 0.15  0.22  0.18  0.17  0.21 0.54 0.25  0.35 
2002 0.17  0.19  0.15  0.13  0.21 0.54 0.25  0
2003 0.24  0.18  0.14  0.16  0.23 0.54 0.23  0.32 
2004 0.23  0.19  0.16  0.19  0.22 0.58 0.20  0.36 
2005 
Children’s variables set equal to zero if no children in benefit unit. 
 







rate (%) in 
TTWA area 
1991 0.41 0.13  8.55 
1992 0.38 0.15  9.98 
1993 0.41 0.14  10.23 
1994 0.37 0.13  9.26 
1995 0.36 0.13  8.19 
1996 0.30 0.12  5.58 
1997 0.32 0.11  4.22 
1998 0.31 0.09  3.85 
1999 0.25 0.13  3.59 
2000 0.32 0.09  2.96 
2001 0.27 0.08  2.85 
2002 0.29 0.07  2.67 
2003 0.26 0.06  2.67 
2004 0.20 0.09  2.31 
2005 0.23 0.08  2.54 
All 0.33  0.11  6.15 
 
 






timates and their interpretation 
n this section  prese hree mai ro   stimat F  i rder to check the 
robustness of re ts to th oice of estimator, we report estimates of a basic specification 
corresponding to equation (7) using five different estimators: a pooled probit model, a 
dynamic random el  
then three
Heckm mators) s i appens, resu ts   in sitive to the choice of estimator, and we 
focus on estima  derive sing the  ck n  roach t rea r.  e second group of 
estimat
unbalan r balanced panel affects the results derived. Third, we present estimates of 
specifica  i e  
degree of state dependence (and hence entry rates 
betw re p  
equa 16) and (17). 
 
The basic specification 
 
Estim s 
5 (in l condi la e 
catego  characterize the situation of ildless adu ucational 
qualifications. (The spousal variables are all equa  zero i is se he first row of the 
table s the estimate of λ, the degree of state dependence. The first column provides the 
estim  a poo  p it estimato in ic o assumptions are made abo the joint 
distribution of the (
random e . 
Co rovides estimates of the dynamic random effects probit model assuming that 
initia itions are exogeneous, and the remaining columns show the results derived using 
the three estim
 
Look  the  s  
magnitude and statistical significan  
lagge rece
three m us initial conditions (columns 3–5, row 1), and are each 
strongly statistically different from zero. Observe how the corresponding estimate when 
initial conditions are ignored provides a substantial over-estimate of λ: it is around 1.45 in 
this case (column 2). Because the pooled probit model uses a different norm  the 
random ffects models, each coefficient estimate from this model needs to be multiplied by 
(1 – 
5 to make it comparable with its counterpart in columns (3)–(5), i.e. a factor of about 
0.79 if one uses the Heckman estimate. Thu fi ate of 1.87 
corresponds to a scaled estimate of ab 1  i.e. of the sam  order as for the m d ith 
exogenous initial conditions. 
 
The magnitude of the effect of past SA recei in
average partial effect (APE) and predicted probability ratio (PPR) explained earlier. We focus 
on the results from the Heckma e e lum  (5) imply an 
average probability of SA –1 of 19.2%, and the average 
probability of receipt cond
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2/0.048). Thus, on average, 
 receip
ition t–1 is 4.8%. The APE is thus 14.4 
.0 ( 





ast receipt is associated with a difference in receipt
 of almost 15 percentage points or, said differently, the probability is some four 
es higher than if there was no receipt last period. These estimates are of roughly the same
rder  m n e  re te y Stewart (2007, Table III, column 3) in his study of 
unem present substantially smaller estimates of 




What he ac s  e statis ally significant associations with the probability of SA 
There is a clear pattern associated with educational qualifications: respondents with more 
 
x r 




but th ss t  a ot stat ally significantly different from zero. The exception is the 
case  a  e  en en t  : the combination of a single adult and the presence of 
dependent children leads to significantly higher probabilities of SA receipt compared to 
single adults wi ut ildren who, in turn, h e  nif nt hig r p ab tie f r ipt 
In addition, SA receipt probabilities are lower for respondents living in owner-occupied 
accommodation, in a region outside London, or in a travel-to-work-area with a relatively low 
are more jobs – and so less unemployment – are more likely to get a job themselves and 
nd  
which appears consistent with the hypothesis that New Labour’s policy reforms had an effect. 
However, the timing is not entirely as expected (WFTC was introduced in October 1999) and, 
in any case, none of the estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero. So, there is no 
strong evidence from these estimates that calendar time effects played a major role in 
explaining the downward trend in overall SA entry and exit rates shown earlier in Figure 6. 
 return to this issue later when discussing the model with an extended specification. 
– representing relatively fixed underlying 
portant role in the basic model. They do help to 
ti  betw n  e  ob ve individual-specific error and 
a
lly signif at the f
e-averag  is the sam





ag itud as 
ics using BHPS data. They re
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trol for heterogeneity. For the pe od 
 63 pe
as a 
rcentage points, or a ratio of
whole, the former is 65.5% 
 27 to 1. 
and the latter is
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differences in the probability of receipt however. 
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year i icators become negative in sign from 1998 onwards,
We
 
Observe that the time-averaged variables 
differences between individuals – play an im




corresponding year-specific variable reported earlie
Living in London (tim
but, having controlled for this
ons






ficients on the tim
o
sign of the coefficient associated
ivin
un
 the coefficient associated with each of the 
r in the table, albeit






e-averaged variables are 
a gi
icant. Note also th
les
e-averaged) is strongly asso
ed variab e as the 
liv
 with the 
yea
 with one exception. 
receipt probabilities, 
en  rve is  
associated w
39
ith a higher SA receipt probability. In addition, we observe that, whereas having 
three or more children in any given year is apparently not associated with receipt 
probabilities, the time-averaged version of this variable has relatively large and statistically
significant coeffic .  
 
In Table 5, we report estimates of the initial conditions equation. Column (1) refers to the 
   
4, co n 3). Column   sh s   e mates from t in l condi s  ua  for the 
Heckman estimato and which was estimated jointly with the model for  ich estimates 
 
generally similar to each other in magnitude and statistical significance. 
 l  
receipt when first observed in the panel as well as with higher chances of receipt at each 
are associated with lower rates of receipt in both cases. On the other hand, whereas lone 
s  
 
 st t 
estimates. 
 
The final part of Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates of the instruments for initial 
condi ns. Focusing o he su fo he Heckman esti tor, we  d  t   of the 
 j  
zero cannot be rejected: the test statistic is 10.72 with a p-value of 0.065. So, the initial 
conditions equation is arguably on the borderline of being identified by the instruments. The 











implication of this finding is that non-linear
ient
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were reported in Table 4, colum
wh
n 5. Corresponding estimates for the two models are
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r ch mple, having ower educational q alifica ns is associated wit high ances of SA
















































































































ficant at conventional levels. However, a 

































































Dynamic effects probit models of the probability of recei of SA  ar t ie
Po ed  Initial conditions  itial  s nous 
4 
pt  at ye  interv w 
  ol     In condition  end ge o
 
 
   e        W e    
                 
Received SA at t–1    *                  
xogenous Orme ooldridg   Heckman 
(1)
1.8 94
(2) (3) (4) (5)
6 ** 1.4539 *** 1.2361 *** 1.2195 *** 1.2307 ***
  (0. 4)                 
  (years)  –0. 08                 
  (0. 2)                 
*   * * * *  * *  
                 
m(s) 
  )  
     
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.2056  ***  –0.2698  ***  –0.2972  ***  –0.2487  ***  –0.2994  *** 
  (0.028)    (0.042)    (0.045)   (0.045)  (0.047)  
  A-level(s)  or  higher  –0.3368  ***  –0.4640  ***  –0.5098  *** –0.4332 *** –0.5204 *** 
  (0.028)    (0.042)    (0.045)   (0.045)  (0.045)  
  Missing  –0.8152  ***  –1.0989  ***  –1.1942  *** –1.1138 *** –1.2154 *** 
  (0.051)    (0.070)    (0.074)   (0.073)  (0.069)  
Spouse’s age (years)  0.0027    0.0029    0.0032    0.0041    0.0033   
  (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.003)  
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.5590  ***  0.6568  ***  0.6798  ***  0.6925  ***  0.6840  *** 
  (0.116)    (0.131)    (0.133)   (0.134)  (0.129)  
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc  0.5224  ***  0.6331  ***  0.6705  ***  0.6777  ***  0.6752  *** 
  (0.110)    (0.124)    (0.127)   (0.127)  (0.119)  
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  0.3928  ***  0.4630  ***  0.4888  ***  0.4976  ***  0.4921  *** 
  (0.109)    (0.123)    (0.125)   (0.126)  (0.119)  
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  0.0697    0.0709    0.0648    0.0618    0.0675   
  (0.130)    (0.146)    (0.150)   (0.150)  (0.153)  
Number of children in BU = 1   –0.0274    –0.0097    0.0002    0.0003    0.0009   
  (0.051)    (0.058)    (0.060)   (0.060)  (0.057)  
Number of children in BU = 2   0.0021    0.0088    0.0295    0.0292    0.0276   
  (0.057)    (0.065)    (0.066)   (0.066)  (0.064)  
02 (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
Age 00 –0.0038 –0.0029 –0.0024 –0.0029
00 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)












0   Has health p .0517   .0580   .0561   .0580   .0561
(0.037
 
  (0.032)    (0.036)    (0.037)   (0.037) 
            Educational  qualifications 
 40Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.0292    0.0558    0.0893    0.0925    0.0925   
.0 2 (0. .084)  (0.  
of ng h 2   4 *  0.   **  0.3061  *  0.   ** 
.0 6 (0. 7) (0  
yp n en 5   2 *  0.   **  0 7  *  0.7103  ** 
.0 9 (0. 1) (0.082)  
yp ou .6   7 *  0.   ** –0 37  *  0.7970  *** 
.1 4 (0. 1 (0.177)  
House  tenure:  owned  –0.1   * 0.   *** – 57 * –0.2153 *** 
  (0.050) 7 (0. )   (0 8)  (0.055)  
Lives in London (inner or ou 0.2752  008   0.   *  0.3301  *  0.3318  ** 
  (0.145)   (0.164 (0. )   (0.169)  (0.137)  
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0288    0.0336 ***  0.   ***  0.0329  ***  0.0394  *** 
  (0.008)    (0.010   (0.011)   (0.011)  (0.011)  
Survey  year             
  1993  0.0164    0.0014    0.0245   0.0191  0.0264  
  (0.045)    (0.049)    (0.051)   (0.051)  (0.049)  
 1994  –0.0387   –0.0645   –0.0329    –0.0489    –0.0294   
  (0.046)    (0.051)    (0.052)   (0.052)  (0.053) 
  (0.056)    (0.064)    (0.067)   (0.067)  (0.068)  
  (0.063)    (0.074)    (0.077)   (0.077)  (0.080)  
  (0.068)    (0.081)    (0.084)   (0.084)  (0.090) 
 2000  0.0414   –0.0228   0.0222    –0.0453    0.0214   
 2001  –0.0467   –0.1235   –0.0789    –0.1482    –0.0703   
  (0.072)    (0.087)    (0.091)   (0.091)  (0.097)  
 2002  –0.0422   –0.1267   –0.0932    –0.1640  *  –0.0900   
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  (0.069)    (0.084)    (0.087)   (0.087)  (0.091
 41  2003  0.0642   0.0006   0.0386  –0.0310   0.0417   
  .0   (0.088)    (0.092)    .0   (0.
  .0  –0.1240   –0.0833   .1 –0. 8
  .0 92   (0. )   .0   (0.
  08 2 0.   .0 0.
  .0 89 (0.   .0   (0.
Time–avera ristic    
  H lem(s)  2 *  3 *  0.   27 *  0.   *
  .0 56 (0.   .059)  (0.061)  
  Sp cational qu cations  .1 –0.193 –0. 7  .2542    –0.1877   
  (0.1 (0.188   (0   .199)  (0.201)  
  Sp evel(s), CS c.  –0.2   –0.4066  *  –0.4516  –0.4646  **  –0.4530  ** 
  (0.145) (0.183)    (0.193)  (0.194)  (0.195)  
  Sp evel(s) or higher  –0.2466  –0.3309    –0.3587  –0.3594  *  –0.3629  * 
  (0.143) (0.180)    (0.190  (0.190)  (0.194)  
  Sp ng educational qualifications  –0.1998  –0.3619    –0.3629    –0.3620    –0.3643   
  (0.182)  (0.233)    (0.246)   (0.247)  (0.261)  
  B e   0.0250    0.1200    0.1414    0.1751    0.1273   
  (0.148)    (0.187)    (0.197)   (0.197)  (0.200)  
  B **
 
  N U =   
  (0.070)    (0.091)    (0.096)   (0.096)  (0.096)  
  N
  (0.074)    (0.094)    (0.099)   (0.099)  (0.102)  
  N dren i U = 3 ** 
 
  A  chi  
  (0.069)    (0.090)    (0.095)   (0.096)  (0.101)  
  Ho re:  owned  –0.5938  ***  –0.7673  ***  –0.7751  *** –0.6422 *** –0.8041 *** 
 
  Liv London (inner or outer)  –0.3062  **  –0.3189  *  –0.3489  *  –0.3331  *  –0.3511  ** 
  (0.149)    (0.173)    (0.179)   (0.179)  (0.146)  
  Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0131  *  0.0221  **  0.0229  **  0.0208  **  0.0227  ** 




















































































































































































































ldren in BU = 2   0.0119    –0.0324    –0.0440    –0.0908    –0.0259   
n B
ld <
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–
   
–
     
st  5 
(0.057)    (0.070)    (0.072)   (0.073)  (0.070)  
 42Generalised error from t =  1  probit 
 
Received SA at t = 1  **
     
Constant  –1   **
  (0
σu   **
 
ρ    **
 
Log-likelihood  8 –
No.  person-years  6695
No.  persons  903
Standard errors shown in parentheses. * p 0.05, M se   
Initial conditions equation estimates show low 
 
   
   
   
.4215  *** 
.102)   
   
   
   
   
887.678  
2   
6   
 *** p < 0.01.. 
    0.4192
   (0.028)
     
  
–1.3653  ***  –1.4709
(0.137)    (0.146)
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Spouse: no educational qualifications  1881    2571   
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Spouse has O–level(s), CS .0398    .0122   
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1
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.0
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  .059)  .070) 
 SEG  1
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  .150)  .173) 
 SEG  1
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 SEG  1
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  .061)  .071) 
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ly zero. 
est that co n all instru ts 
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  45Unbalanced versus balanced samples  
 
In Table 6, we retain the Heckman estimator and the basic specification, but explore 
sensitivity to the type of sample used. (Initial conditions equations corresponding to each of 
these estimates are reported in Appendix Table B1. stim s re  in  mn  
derived from an unbalanced panel, as above, with the exception that we only use adults 
whose sequences began in wave 1. This reduces t  siz  sub , to 5,06
c 509 person-wave observations. The ates reported in colum  2 are from 
a
29,940 person-wave observations. (We return to discussion of column 3 shortly.) 
Reassuringly, the estimates from columns 1 and 2 are broadly consistent with each other, and 
with those from Table 4, column 5 discussed earlier, in terms of the point estimates and their 
statistical significance.
25 The state dependence effect is similar. For example, the APE 
corresponding to the column 1 estimates is 13.0 percentage points and the PPR, 5.1; for the 
column 2 estimates, the APE and PPR are 19.1 percentage points and 4.4. (The earlier 
estimates were 14.4 percentage points and 4.0.) 
 
The most obvious differences across the columns concern the estimates for the local 
unemployment rate and for the survey year indicators. The local unemployment rate loses 
statistical significance (absolute t-ratios, not shown, are smaller) but, on the other hand, the 
survey year dummies are now jointly statistically significant and their coefficients tend to be 
larger (more negative) towards the end of the period compared to the beginning – which is 
consistent with the downward trend in unemployment rates over the period (and the declining 
SA exit and entry shown in Figure 6). This raises the question whether it is more difficult to 
identify separate effects of time and unemployment rates for these samples – there may be 
less independent variation in the series, and the sample sizes are smaller.  
 
The other noticeable difference from the results discussed earlier concerns the initial 
conditions estimates for the unbalanced sample with all sequences starting at wave 3. 
According to the Wald test, instrument validity is now not rejected at the 1% level of 
significance (the p-value is 0.020). On the other hand, for the fifteen wave balanced panel the 
p-value for the test is 0.94.  
 
Notwithstanding these results, the coefficient estimates are close to those derived using the 
Wooldridge and Orme estimators (not shown). So, our overall conclusion is that the choice of 
sample does not have a major impact on the conclusions drawn. We therefore proceed to 
investigate variations on the basic specification using the complete unbalanced panel. 
                                                
) The e ate ported colu  1 were
he le  samp e s lly tantia   7 s   adult
ontributing 51,  estim n
n even smaller sample – the balanced fifteen-wave sample of 1,996 adults contributing 
 
 
25 We also applied the Orme and Wooldridge estimators to these two samples, and the estimates were similar to 
their Heckman estimator counterparts. The estimates are not reported for brevity. 
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Table 6 
sequences start at 
balanced panel  panel, excluding 
sequences with 
Dynamic effects probit models of the probability of receipt of SA at year t survey interview  
(Heckman estimator), by type of estimation sample 
Unbalanced 
panel, all 
Fifteen-wave  Unbalanced 
  
wave 1  continuous 
receipt 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Received SA at t–1  1.2542 *** 1.3553 *** 0.5025 *** 
  (0.042)  (0.058)  (0.055) 
Age  (years)  –0.0045   0.0006   –0.0064 
  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.002) 
Female  –0.0837  *  –0.0285  –0.0871 
  (0.045)  (0.066)  (0.032) 
Has  health  problem(s)  0.0567  0.0368  0.0539 







62)  (0.043)  


























  (0.100)  (0.129)  (0.105)  
BU  type:  couple  –1.1259 *** –1.0232 *** –0.3429  * 
  (0.226)  (0.334)  (0.196)  
House  tenure:  owned  –0.2836 *** –0.2796 *** –0.1306  ** 
  (0.073)  (0.096)  (0.063)  
Lives in London (inner or outer)  0.2288    0.2148    0.2797  ** 
  (0.177)  (0.237)  (0.133)  
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0212  *  0.0153    0.0376  *** 
  (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.011)  
Survey  year        
  1993  0.0461   –0.0119   0.0403  
Edu
  O-level(s),  CSE,  etc.  –0.2530 *** –0.2653 *** –0.1642 
  (0.055)  (0.083)  (0.044) 
  A-level(s)  or  higher  –0.4325 *** –0.4334 *** –0.2756 
  (0.054)  (0.081)  (0.044) 
  Missing  –1.2007 *** –0.9469 *** –0.7906 
  (0.089)  (0.152)  (0.077) 
Spouse’s  age  (years)  0.0045  0.0094  0.0012 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Spouse:  no  educational  qualifications  0.8555 *** 0.7362 *** 0.3742 
  (0.148)  (0.217)  (0.159) 
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  0.9399  ***  0.8745  ***  0.3377 
  (0.143)  (0.200)  (0.150) 
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  0.7161  ***  0.5776  ***  0.2864 
  (0.143)  (0.200)  (0.148) 
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  0.2544    0.1351    –0.0747 
  (0.182)  (0.249)  (0.178) 
Number of children in BU = 1  0.0018    –0.0941    –0.0159 
 
Number of children in BU = 2  0.0215    –0.1218    –0.0466 
  (0.075)  (0.095)  (0.073) 
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.1013    –0.0077    0.0477 
  (0.097)  (0.119)  (0.097) 
Age of youngest child < 5  0.3051  ***  0.2297  ***  0.2564 
  (0.056)  (0.067)  (0.055) 
BU  type:  lone  parent  0.5723 *** 0.7557 *** 0.6276 
  47  (0.052)  (0.085)  (0.054) 
  1994 
 
–0.0702    –0.1679 * –0.0377   










(0.111)  (0.185)  (0.096)  











(0.133)  (0.208)  (0.100)  






















43)  (0.251)  (0.104)  
House  tenure:  owned  –0.6352 *** –0.8446 *** –0.5712 *** 
  (0.092)  (0.127)  (0.074)  
  Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.2017    –0.2067    –0.3454  ** 
  (0.186)  (0.259)  (0.138)  
  Unemployment rate in TTWA(%)  0.0310  **  0.0413    0.0135   
  (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.010)  
 
  1995  –0.0611  –0.0497  –0.0375 
  (0.063)  (0.099)  (0.061) 
  1996  –0.1021    –0.2672 ** –0.0168 
  (0.078)  (0.129)  (0.074) 
 1997  –0.1255    –0.2812  *  0.0269 
  (0.093)  (0.154)  (0.083) 
  1998  –0.2999 *** –0.4693 *** –0.1088 
  (0.106)  (0.171)  (0.089) 
  1999  –0.2327 ** –0.4434 ** –0.1286 
 
 
  (0.112)  (0.190)  (0.098) 
  2001  –0.2529 ** –0.4165 ** –0.3185 
  (0.123)  (0.194)  (0.105) 
  2002  –0.2414 ** –0.5268  ***  –0.2159 
  (0.120)  (0.196)  (0.101) 
  2003  –0.0982  –0.3150  –0.1236 
  (0.124)  (0.198)  (0.100) 
  2004  –0.3493 ** –0.6258  ***  –0.2361 
  (0.143)  (0.224)  (0.108) 
  2005  –0.2016    –0.4505 ** –0.0743 
 
  Has  health  problem(s)  0.3139 *** 0.2523  **  0.1736 
  (0.075)  (0.109)  (0.060) 
  Spouse: no educational qualifications  –0.0257    0.4413    0.0182 
  (0.252)  (0.428)  (0.210) 
  Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.3421    0.0214    –0.0760 
  (0.250)  (0.409)  (0.206) 
  Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.2429    0.2501    –0.1113 
  (0.248)  (0.407)  (0.202) 
  Spouse’s  missing  educational  qualifications  –0.1441   0.4950   –0.0703 
  (0.327)  (0.497)  (0.263) 
  BU  type:  couple  0.0562   –0.4023  –0.0453 
  (0.253)  (0.422)  (0.208) 
  BU type: lone parent  0.5321  ***  0.4080    –0.0015 
 
  Number of children in BU = 1  0.0737    0.1499    –0.0881 
  (0.121)  (0.186)  (0.096) 
  Number of children in BU = 2  –0.1838    –0.1693    –0.0238 
  (0.130)  (0.196)  (0.100) 
  Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.3261  **  0.3416    0.1618 
  (0.150)  (0.234)  (0.129) 
  Age of youngest child < 5  0.1409    0.4774  *  –0.1371 
  (0.1
 
  48Constant  –1.4181 *** –1.4315 *** –1.4846 











d errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix Table B1 for the estimates of the 
ointly-estimated initial conditions equation. 
u 0.7397 *** 0.6864 *** 0.4442 
  (0.036)  (0.048)  (0.032) 
ρ  0.3537 *** 0.3203 *** 0.1648 
  (0.022)  (0.306)  (0.020) 
Log-likelihood  –6811.240   –3409.21  –7596.00 
No.  person-years  51509  29940  72433 
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concerns the prevalence of ‘continui
 
Am
(63%) were also in receipt at the previous in
receipt. Put another way, for this group, the a
receipt durin
spells raises questions about whether 
50
e turn first to the issue of heterogeneity in state dependence effects and the interpretation of 
ates of the coefficient on the lagged SA receipt variable (λ). One dimension of this issue
ng’ spells of benefit receipt.  
ong those in receipt of SA at the time of an annual interview, a substantial proportion 
terview without any intervening months of non-
ssociation between receipt at interview and 
g year simply reflects the length of the spell. The existence of these ‘continuing’ 
 
dependence in this case. (See e.g. Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) and Stewart 
(200 or furthe ssion.) Another way of stating the issue is to say that the prevalence 
of ‘continuing’ spells draws atte
meas  d ed  ple that pools individuals with and without continuing spells will 
be a m bination of the measures for the separate groups.  
 
There are several ways to address this issue.
26 The first and most common practice, which we 
also f stimate the model excluding the continuous spell observations 
and to compare the e ates with those from the original full sample model. The problem 
with oac at the subsample selection may be endogenous, and this motivates the 
second m d, using a bivariate probit random effects model to control for such selection. 
Stewart (2007) estimated such a model though, in s ly   or ha e could t 
reject independence (2007, p. 522). A third method, also impl en  b te rt  0 s 
to allow for heterogeneity in state dependence issue directly, rather than by distinguishing 
betw tinu d d 
differences in 
relative igh an tiv to 
fit his unemployment data particularly well.) A fourth method is to allow slopes to vary with 
differences in observed rather than unobserved ch  
of the SA recipients with continuing spells are lone parents, a substantial over-representation 
re ro sa d 
SA receipt and the lone parent indicator.
 
The estim erived when we excluded adults with continuing SA receipt are shown in 
colum e sample selection is to reduce the estimate of 
the coefficient on lagged SA receipt from well above unity to 0.503, a reduction of more than 
one half. There is also a sharp fall in the APE, to 3.7 percentage points, and in the PPR to 2.4, 
comp ts and 4.0 for the full sample. This is evidence consistent 
with the concept of heterogeneity in state dependence. The estimates for the other coefficients 
                                                 
26 The three social assistance dynamics papers cited earlier do not acknowledge this issue. It has received most 
attent he unemploy  dynamics literature: see Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) and Stewart 
(2007)
27 Arul palam, Boot nd Ta ) d di ences bet d l h 5 y  vers
those a ore than  ers a e age  25  m  An én ( 07) w
heteroge ty in λ usi n h a  f rve es. B  cont o
Zhang 06), and Han en fstro  (2 ) allowed  pe ce to by fittin a m ls 
for di ent groups (t se f t C ces m us nati
respectively). 




























 (3) of Table 6. The principal effect of th



































































λ characterised by a discrete distribut
aracteristics. We note that just under 30%
lati  the g
ates d




















































































ly in line with those estimated with the Heckman estimator applied to the whole 
ple (Table 5, column 5). 
ates from specifications that introduce interactions between 
 variables and lagged SA receipt in order whether effects differ with calendar 
e or across groups. (See Appendix Table B2 for estimates of the initial conditions 
s that were estimated jointly with the equation reported in Table 7. The p-value for 
the test of instrument validity was 0.06 or 0.07 in each case.) Apart from the interactions, the 
sets of explanatory variables are identical to those used for the basic specification discussed
earlier. The sample is also the full sample of 75,988 person-wave observations used earlier. 
s




for year t–1). The table shows that none of the survey year interactions for years prior to 1998 
. 
The interaction point estim es for the l  1 s  ards fo w  cl  monotonic pattern, 
but a re  ar e o s f ars or sta ,   es at f λ r 
1992 is 1.065 whereas, for 2005, it is 1.065+0.440 = 1.505.   
lar s le r 
things being equal. This is consistent with the downward trend in the raw SA exit rate 
pictured  Figu 6. 
 
Specification (2) is the same as specification (1) except that the estimate of λ is now free to 
er b lts  
cific ( t  
jointly equal to zero is rejected with χ
2(2) test statistic 25.07 with a p-value of 0.000. In the 
implied by specification (1). For example, the estimate for 1992 is 0.995 and for 2005 it is 
dditiona ariab s 
ease in λ across  s mo  
exit rates did not fall as much, other things being equal, which is broadly consistent with the 
trends shown in Figures 6 and 9). 
 
To focus on differences before and after 1998, we estimated specification (3) in which the 
individual survey year slope shifters used in (2) were combined into just t variables that 
distinguished between the earlier and later period. According to a likelihood ratio test, we 
cannot reject (3) in favour of (2): the χ
2(12) test statistic is 13.23 with a p-value of 0.353. The 
estim λ
2005. For lone parents, the corresponding estimates are 1.4 n .5 th by p g a 
decline in th te, other things being equal.  
 
                                                 
28 The m if ce from m e o e su ey year i t 
sh  d . Bu h s n al pattern int 
esti







teractions between survey year and lagged SA receipt, and the 
riables a efin  so at the reference category refers to 1992 for year t (and hence 1991
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augmented model, the estimates of λ for non-lone parents are slightly smaller than those 
1.379. The a






















































ate of   for non-lone parents is now 0.990 for years before 1998, and 1.484 for 1998–
e SA exit ra
78 a d 1
ost obvious d feren
y















e po ifters are now statisticall
mates.  
iffere t t  to th
  
The final specification, (4), is th
intercept shifter variables so
1998 and afterwards. The pooling was suggested by th
(3): they becom
likelihood ratio test, we cannot reje
52
e same as (3) except that is also combines the survey year 
 that they distinguished only between years before 1998, and 
e pattern of the coefficient estimates in 
e negative and statistically significant from 1998 onwards. According to a
ct (4) in favour of (3): the χ
2(12) test statistic is 14.84 with 
a p-value of 0.250. And the coefficients on the other variables in (4) are very similar to their 
counterparts in (3). According to (4), there was a clear fall in both SA entry rates and SA 
persistence rates in the period from 1998 onwards, relative to 1991–1997, other things being 
equal. 
 
of the introduction of major welfare-to-work policies such as WFTC by the Labour 
nt trend over time in the SA exit rate for lone parents 
ber of whom were headed by lone parents. Thus, 
there is some suggestion that the introduction of these policies did have a causal impact on 
 
not only because the timing of the change in coefficients does not exactly match the timing of 
the oli ch in o subs co us s   
 
 
Instea w rn w  interpr he estimates further with reference to the steady state SA 
entry  p is e es d ociated statistics, implied by them. 
 
                                                 
29 An identification strategy based on a difference-in-differences approach would more explicitly compare the 
experience of lone mothers with that of comparison groups (married mothers with children and 
omen) before and after the re rms. For studies of the causal effect of WFTC introduction on lone 
hers’ labour supply, see e rewe t al. (2006), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007), and Gregg, 










































 intended targeting of these policies on low 
SA
hange in slope and intercept interaction effects in 1998 almost lines up with the timing 











ch directed at this specific ques
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substantially m
cur



















m effects probit models of the probability of receipt of  r t su vey in Heck an es ), 
with interactions between lagged  ceipt  atus ar, and lone tatus 
 S   r 
in s 
rvey y ar and nt int ractions 
 






urvey yea   Su e  lone pare e  
teraction
                
1.0 50  * * 0.9 50  * *  0.9 01  * *    * 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Received SA at t–1  6 * 9 * 9 * 0.9922 **
  (0. 9 (0 0)   (0.0 4)    )   
year is               
             
         
             
         
             
         
             
         
             
         
        * *     
         
           
         
        * *     
         
    *   * *     
         
           
         
 20  *    ***         
 (0.167)    (0.168)           
 2004  0.3518  **  0.4243  **         
 (0.167)    (0.167)           
 2005  0.4397  ***  0.4841  ***         
09 )   .10 4 (0.044
Received SA at t–1 and survey 
1993  –0.0139 –0.0130    
(0.128)    (0.127)   
1994  –0.1423 –0.1448    
(0.131)    (0.131)   
1995  0.0287 0.0229    
(0.132)    (0.132)   
1996  0.0175 –0.0118    
(0.133)    (0.132)   
1997  0.1564 0.1646    
(0.138)    (0.137)   
1998  0.3200 ** 0.3797 *    
(0.145)    (0.147)   
1999  0.4899 ***  0.5305 ***    
(0.148)    (0.150)   
2000  0.3343 ** 0.4031 *    
(0.154)    (0.156)   
2001  0.5965 **  0.6431 *    
(0.154)    (0.158)   
2002  0.4436 ***  0.4844 ***    
(0.158)    (0.159)   
03  0.6567 ** 0.6686
 53 (0.162)    (0.164)           
Received SA at t–1 and survey year is 1998–2005          0.4942  *** 0.4789 *** 
         (0.057)    (0.056)   
Received SA at t–1 and BU is lone parent at t      0.4838  ***  0.4882  *** 0.4827 *** 
     (0.090)    (0.089)   (0.088)  
Received SA at t–1, BU is lone parent at t, and survey 
year is 1998–2005      –0.3742  ***  –0.3735  *** –0.3717 *** 
     (0.114)    (0.112)   (0.111)  
Age  (years)  –0.0033   –0.0027   –0.0027    –0.0025   
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)    (0.002)   
Female    –0.1037  *** –0.0987  ***  –0.0983  *** –0.0963 *** 
  (0.037)   (0.037)   (0.037)    (0.037)   
Has health problem(s)  0.0551    0.0569    0.0585    0.0592   
  (0.037)   (0.037)   (0.037)    (0.037)   
Educational qualifications               
  O-level(s),  CSE,  etc.  –0.2980  *** –0.3006  ***  –0.2971  *** –0.2966 *** 
  (0.046)   (0.046)   (0.046)    (0.046)   
  A-level(s)  or  higher  –0.5093  *** –0.5133  ***  –0.5116  *** –0.5081 *** 
  (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.045)    (0.044)   
  Missing  –1.1960  *** –1.2034  ***  –1.1970  *** –1.1902 *** 
  (0.068)   (0.069)   (0.068)    (0.068)   
Spouse’s age (years)  0.0033    0.0023    0.0022    0.0023   
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)    (0.003)   
Spouse:  no  educational  qualifications  0.6637  *** 0.6701  ***  0.6611  *** 0.6495 *** 
  (0.130)   (0.131)   (0.130)    (0.130)   
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  0.6391  ***  0.6440  ***  0.6348  ***  0.6245  *** 
  (0.121)   (0.122)   (0.121)    (0.121)   
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  0.4767  ***  0.4706  ***  0.4560  ***  0.4511  *** 
  (0.122)   (0.122)   (0.121)    (0.121)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  0.0490    0.0540    0.0314    0.0328   
  (0.154)   (0.155)   (0.155)    (0.154)   
Number of children in BU = 1   0.0070    0.0106    0.0110    0.0079   
  (0.058)   (0.058)   (0.058)    (0.057)   
Number of children in BU = 2   0.0388    0.0375    0.0344    0.0286   





































ber of children in BU = 3 or more  0.1018    0.1178    0.1180    0.1072   
(0.084)   (0.085)   (0.083)    (0.082)   
 of youngest child < 5  0.3035  ***  0.3021  ***  0.3049  ***  0.2962  *** 
(0.045)   (0.045)   (0.045)    (0.044)   
U  type:  lone  parent  0.7356  *** 0.6024  ***  0.5917  *** 0.6006 *** 
(0.083)   (0.092)   (0.091)    (0.091)   
U  type:  couple  –0.7755  *** –0.7485  ***  –0.7349  *** –0.7251 *** 
(0.179)   (0.179)   (0.178)    (0.177)   
use  tenure:  owned  –0.1978  *** –0.2013  ***  –0.2014  *** –0.1972 *** 
(0.055)   (0.055)   (0.055)    (0.055)   
es in London (inner or outer)  0.3166  **  0.3153  **  0.3216  **  0.3173  ** 
(0.137)   (0.138)   (0.137)    (0.136)   
ployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0412  ***  0.0417  ***  0.0411  ***  0.0353  *** 
(0.011)   (0.011)   (0.011)    (0.007)   
             
1993  0.0343   0.0371   0.0399       
(0.058)   (0.058)   (0.051)       
94  0.0221    0.0305    –0.0060       
(0.062)   (0.062)   (0.054)       
1995  0.0060   0.0048   0.0133       
(0.064)   (0.064)   (0.057)       
1996  0.0493   0.0635   0.0595       
(0.075)   (0.075)   (0.067)       
1997  0.0027   0.0133   0.0635       
(0.086)   (0.086)   (0.079)       
1998  –0.1200   –0.1105   –0.1501  *     
(0.091)   (0.091)   (0.084)       
1999  –0.1830 *  –0.1687  * –0.1661  *     
(0.098)   (0.098)   (0.089)       
2000  –0.0325   –0.0264   –0.0617       
(0.096)   (0.096)   (0.090)       
2001  –0.2239 **  –0.2176  ** –0.1659 *     
(0.103)   (0.104)   (0.096)       
02  –0.1783  *  –0.1630    –0.1671  *     




































2003  –0.0869   –0.0595   –0.0163       
(0.101)   (0.101)   (0.095)       
2004  –0.1424   –0.1281   –0.1610       
(0.109)   (0.109)   (0.102)       
2005  –0.0138   0.0036  –0.0045       
(0.101)   (0.101)   (0.095)       
1998–2005            –0.1693  *** 
          (0.041)   
e-averaged characteristics               
Has  health  problem(s)  0.3066  *** 0.3080  ***  0.3068  *** 0.3062 *** 
(0.060)   (0.061)   (0.061)    (0.060)   
Spouse: no educational qualifications  –0.1544    –0.1624    –0.1598    –0.1510   
(0.199)   (0.201)   (0.200)    (0.199)   
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc  –0.3948  **  –0.4115  **  –0.4078  **  –0.3996  ** 
(0.193)   (0.194)   (0.194)    (0.192)   
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.3200  *  –0.3323  *  –0.3267  *  –0.3228  * 
(0.192)   (0.194)   (0.193)    (0.191)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.3250    –0.3319    –0.3083    –0.3167   
(0.257)   (0.259)   (0.259)    (0.257)   
BU type: couple   0.0883    0.1109    0.1088    0.0955   
(0.198)   (0.199)   (0.198)    (0.197)   
BU type: lone parent  0.3506  **  0.3314  **  0.3474  **  0.3360  ** 
(0.137)   (0.138)   (0.138)    (0.137)   
Number of children in BU = 1   –0.0167    –0.0144    –0.0169    –0.0080   
(0.096)   (0.096)   (0.096)    (0.095)   
Number of children in BU = 2   –0.0404    –0.0360    –0.0412    –0.0340   
(0.103)   (0.103)   (0.102)    (0.102)   
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.3639  ***  0.3475  ***  0.3407  ***  0.3560  *** 
(0.124)   (0.124)   (0.123)    (0.122)   
Age of youngest child < 5  –0.0962    –0.0954    –0.1002    –0.0898   
(0.101)   (0.101)   (0.101)    (0.099)   
House  tenure:  owned  –0.7926  *** –0.7943  ***  –0.8002  *** –0.8072 *** 
(0.070)   (0.070)   (0.070)    (0.069)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.3319  **  –0.3330  **  –0.3386  **  –0.3314  ** 
(0.146)   (0.147)   (0.146)    (0.144)     Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0222  **  0.0220  **  0.0218  **  0.0225  ** 
    (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.010)    (0.009)   
Constant  –1.4340  *** –1.4545  ***  –1.4474  *** –1.3882 *** 
  (0.147)   (0.147)   (0.146)    (0.123)   
σu 0.7526 ***  0.7576  *** 0.7579  ***  0.7598   
  (0.030)   (0.030)   (0.030)    (0.029)   
ρ  0.3616 ***  0.3647  *** 0.3648  ***  0.3660   
  (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)    (0.018)   
Log-likelihood  –10709.97   –10697.43   –10704.05    –10711.47   
No. person-years  75,988   75,988   75,988    75,988   
No. persons  9,036   9,036   9,036    9,036   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix Table B1 for the estimates of the jointly-estimated initial 
conditions equation. 
 
 57Implications of the parameter estimates 
 
We now consider the ‘Boskin and Nold’ predictions of SA entry and persistence rates, and 
related statistics such as spell lengths that are implied by our preferred specification (model 
(4) reported in Table 7). The predictions are based on the formulae shown in equations (17) 
and (18). We should stress that these are ‘steady state’ predictions – what would apply were 
SA entry and exit rates to each remain constant over the indefinite future. This is a fictional 
scenario, of course, as we have already shown how SA transition probabilities have varied 
over time. Thus, the predictions should be considered as transformations of the model 
parameters that help illuminate their interpretation in terms of concepts that are more 
familiar. The derivation of the predictions also requires specification of each of series of 
‘person types’ characterized by a particular configuration of characteristics. Some 
characteristics (such as age) change over time and that is not taken into account when 
deriving the predictions. All explanatory variables are set at fixed constant values. Hence a 
year-specific variables and its time-averaged counterpart have the same value: the effect of 
the variable is the sum of the coefficients on the two variables. 
 
The statistics that we calculate from the model estimates are the steady state SA entry rate 
(ei), the SA persistence rate (si) i.e. one minus the exit rate, the median duration of SA receipt 
for someone beginning an SA spell, and the median duration of SA non-receipt for someone 
ending an SA spell. We supplement these with the calculation of the unconditional 
probability of being found in SA receipt at any interview (which might also be interpreted as 
the predicted proportion of total time spent in SA receipt), and also the expected turnover 
rate.
30 We also calculated mean spell lengths but do not report them for brevity (they are 
larger than the corresponding medians, since the spell length distributions are skewed). The 
difference between the mean and median is a reminder that there is dispersion in spell lengths 
even among individuals sharing the same characteristics. 
 
We begin by specifying the characteristics of a reference person type, and then explore the 
implications of varying characteristics relative to this baseline case. The reference person is a 
40 year old woman, living outside London in an area with unemployment rate of 9%, with 
one child aged under 5 years, married (spouse aged 40), no health problems, no educational 
qualifications (self and spouse), owner-occupier, survey year is before 1998. Table 8 shows 
the transition rates and spell lengths predicted by the model estimates. 
 
For the base case the annual probability of remaining in SA receipt is 0.648, and the annual 
probability of SA entry is 0.341. This corresponds to a median spell length of SA receipt of 
1.6 years for someone beginning a spell of SA receipt, and a median spell length of SA non-
receipt of 1.7 years for someone ending a spell of SA receipt. The unconditional probability 
of SA receipt is just under one half (0.49) and the expected turnover rate is 0.17.  
 
Subsequent rows of Table 8 show the corresponding predictions for different person types. 
For example, if the respondent has A-levels or higher educational qualifications rather no 
qualifications (row 4), her SA persistence rate falls substantially (to 0.490) and her SA entry 
rate also falls. The median SA spell length falls to less than a year (0.97 years) and the 
median non-receipt spell length increases to 3 years. The unconditional probability of SA 
receipt falls to 0.289 (from 0.492). If the respondent’s spouse also has A-levels or higher 
educational qualifications rather no qualifications (row 5), the median SA spell length falls 
                                                 
30 Standard errors for the predictions are derived using the delta method, and are non-linear functions of the 
variance covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates. The fixed values of the covariates used to characterize 
each person type are treated as non-stochastic. 
  58even further to just over half a year (0.52) and the unconditional probability of receipt falls to 
less than one tenth (0.09). 
 
The steady state predictions corresponding to survey years 1998 and afterwards yield to 
lower entry rates and higher persistence rates (lower exit rates). But at the same time, we 
know that unemployment rates fell over the 1990s – a factor associated with lower 
persistence rates and lower entry rates. The net effect (row 12) is a slightly lower persistence 
rate relative to the base case (0.64 rather than 0.65), and an entry rate about one third smaller 
(0.21 rather than 0.34). The median SA spell length is only slightly smaller than the base 
case, but the median time spell in non receipt increases substantially (it is 3.0 years rather 
than 1.7), and the unconditional probability of receipt falls to 0.36 from 0.49. 
 
Table 8 underlines the disadvantage in SA receipt terms that is associated with being a lone 
parent (row 13) and living in non-owned accommodation (row 8) or the combination of these 
factors (row 14). A lone mother living in social housing is predicted to have an SA 
persistence rate of almost one (0.99) and a very high entry rate as well (0.88), which 
correspond to a predicted median SA spell length of 71 years. (This is of course virtually 
impossible, which is a reminder that all these predictions are extrapolations made on the 
assumption that characteristics do not change. Note too that the standard errors associated 
with the predicted medians are relatively large.)  
 
At the bottom of the table (row 17), we contrast this high-receipt probability case with the 
case of someone with ‘favourable characteristics’. She has the same characteristics as Base 
Case, except that she and her partner have educational qualifications to A-level or higher, the 
local unemployment rate is 3%, and her youngest child is aged over 5 years. Compared to the 
base case, the SA persistence rate is about one third as large (0.22 compared to 0.65) and the 
entry rate is less than one fifth as large (0.06 rather than 0.34), implying a median SA spell 
length of less than a year and median non-receipt spell length of 11 years. The unconditional 
probability of SA receipt is one seventh that of the base case: 0.07 rather than 0.29. Observe 
that the expected turnover rate for this person is relatively small (0.06), which happens to be 
the rate for a lone mother as well. But the low turnover arises in very different ways – from 
remaining off SA in the former case, and remaining in receipt in the latter case. 
 
Overall, it appears from Table 8 that there is greater individual heterogeneity in SA entry 
rates than in SA persistence rates. Probabilities of SA entry range from 0.061 to 0.878, 
compared with variation in persistence probabilities from 0.224 to 0.990. The relative 
importance of heterogeneity in entry rates was also remarked on by Cappellari and Jenkins 
(2004) in their BHPS-based study of differences in poverty entry and exit rates. 
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Predicted ‘Boskin-Nold’ steady-state SA transition probabilities and related statistics for different types of person 












   si   ei  (years)   (years)          
1. Base  0.648  (0.052)  0.341  (0.049)  1.597  (0.294)  1.663  (0.299)  0.492  (0.072)  0.173  (0.004) 
As Base, except:                         
2. Man  0.676  (0.049)  0.369  (0.049)  1.770  (0.325)  1.504  (0.255)  0.533  (0.070)  0.173  (0.005) 
3.  Has health problems   0.749  (0.045)  0.453  (0.054)  2.396  (0.499)  1.151  (0.190)  0.643  (0.068)  0.162  (0.012) 
4.  Respondent has A-level(s) or 
higher 
0.490 (0.059)  0.208  (0.041)  0.972  (0.163)  2.979  (0.658)  0.289  (0.063)  0.148  (0.016) 
5.  Respondent and spouse have 
A-level(s) or higher 
0.262 (0.069)  0.077  (0.030)  0.517  (0.101)  8.688  (3.541)  0.094  (0.041)  0.069  (0.024) 
6.  Youngest child < 5  0.585  (0.048)  0.283  (0.040)  1.294  (0.200)  2.086  (0.349)  0.405  (0.061)  0.168  (0.007) 
7. Has  3+  children  0.720  (0.049)  0.418  (0.055)  2.114  (0.438)  1.279  (0.224)  0.600  (0.073)  0.168  (0.009) 
8. Non-owner  0.881  (0.027)  0.652  (0.049)  5.467  (1.326)  0.657  (0.087)  0.845  (0.039)  0.101  (0.018) 
9.  Lives in London  0.644  (0.054)  0.337  (0.051)  1.574 (0.298) 1.689 (0.316) 0.486 (0.075)  0.173 (0.004) 
10.  Local unemployment rate = 
3% 
0.541 (0.052)  0.246  (0.040)  1.129  (0.178)  2.452  (0.459)  0.349  (0.062)  0.160  (0.011) 
11.  Survey year after 1998  0.733  (0.049)  0.293  (0.050)  2.236  (0.486)  2.000  (0.404)  0.524  (0.087)  0.140  (0.005) 
12.  Survey year after 1998, local 
unemployment rate = 3% 
0.636 (0.053)  0.206  (0.038)  1.531  (0.280)  3.008  (0.620)  0.361  (0.074)  0.131  (0.009) 
13. Lone  mother  0.938  (0.019)  0.643  (0.054)  10.845  (3.347)  0.672  (0.098)  0.912  (0.030)  0.056  (0.015) 
14.  Lone mother and non-owner  0.990  (0.004)  0.878  (0.029)  71.287  (28.496)  0.329  (0.037)  0.989  (0.005)  0.010  (0.004) 
15.  Lone mother and survey year 
is post-1998 
0.932 (0.021)  0.592  (0.059)  9.801  (3.140)  0.773  (0.125)  0.897  (0.037)  0.061  (0.016) 
16.  Lone mother, survey year is 
post-1998, local 
unemployment rate = 3% 
0.887 (0.029)  0.483  (0.057)  5.801  (1.590)  1.052  (0.175)  0.811  (0.055)  0.091  (0.017) 
17. Favourable  characteristics  0.224  (0.035)  0.061  (0.013)  0.463  (0.049)  11.094  (2.507)  0.072  (0.018)  0.056  (0.011) 
Predictions derived from model (4) estimates shown in Table 7. For the formulae used to generate the predictions, see main text. Base case refers to a 40 year old woman, living 
outside London in an area with unemployment rate of 9%, with one child aged under 5 years, married (spouse aged 40), no health problems, no educational qualifications (self and 
spouse), owner-occupier, survey year is before 1998. ‘Favourable characteristics’ case is as Base Case, except high educational qualifications for respondent and spouse, local 
unemployment rate is 3%, and age of youngest child is over 5 years. 
 6. Summary and conclusions 
 
We have modelled the dynamics of social assistance benefit receipt in Britain using data from 
the British Household Panel Survey, waves 1–15 (survey years 1991–2005), and have fitted a 




There are clear associations between the probability of SA receipt and a number of 
characteristics. Probabilities of receipt are slightly higher for men than women – unless the 
women are lone parents in which case the probabilities are very much higher. Living in non-
owned housing is also associated with relatively high probabilities of receipt. Probabilities 
are also higher for individuals with young children, or with relatively low educational 
qualifications. Having a spouse with low educational qualifications raises the chances of SA 
receipt further. Receipt probabilities are lower for those living outside London, or in a travel-
to-work area with a low unemployment rate. Differences in age, or having health problems, 
have no statistically significant association with the probability of SA receipt.  
 
The risk of receiving SA in one year is noticeably higher if SA was also received in the 
previous year, even after controlling for observed and unobserved differences in 
characteristics. According to the basic model specification, the risk is about 14 percentage 
points higher (19% rather than 5%). This might be interpreted as a state dependence or 
scarring effect of SA receipt, but such an interpretation requires caution particularly because 
it suggests that there is a single effect for all individuals. By contrast, we have demonstrated 
that there are marked differences between groups of individuals. SA persistence rates are 
much higher for those with continuing spells compared to those with non-receipt in the period 
between annual interviews, and also much higher for lone parents compared to other groups.  
 
These substantive findings about the impact of different characteristics and of past benefit 
receipt are broadly in line with the small number of existing studies of SA receipt for Sweden 
and Canada. They are also, unsurprisingly, broadly consistent with previous studies of related 
topics such as unemployment dynamics and poverty dynamics. It would be surprising if they 
were not given the close links between unemployment, low income and receipt of SA. 
 
Unlike previous studies, we have given substantial attention to trends over time in SA receipt 
and transition rates. We have shown that there was a clear decline over the last 15 years in the 
average SA annual entry rate (from above 4% to below 2%), and there was also rise in the 
average SA annual persistence rate from around 60% to nearly 75% (corresponding to a 
decline in the annual exit rate from around 40% to nearly 25%). It was the decline in entry 
rates that was principally responsible for the decline in the cross-sectional rates of SA receipt, 
rather than changes in SA exit rates. According to the model estimates, the key distinction in 
pure calendar time effects was between the period before 1998 and the period thereafter, 
which is somewhat of a puzzle since the timing does not closely correspond with the 
introduction of one of New Labour’s major policy reforms to the social security system. We 
have also pointed out how changes in the characteristics of the populations at risk of entering 
and of remaining in SA receipt affected the overall SA entry and persistence rates. Factors 
such as the secular rise in educational qualifications and the decline in local unemployment 
rates would have reduced the entry rate. The growing concentration of individuals living in 
social housing among SA recipients was associated with the declining SA exit rates.  
 
  61Lessons for studies of other countries and methodological issues 
 
We have discussed at length the definitions of SA itself and its component income sources, 
the unit of SA receipt, and the reference period over which receipt is measured. We have 
argued that there are a number of important choices to be made concerning each of these and, 
importantly, the choices that are feasible in the context of empirical analysis will depend on 
the specific country and on the data sources that are available. Changes to the social security 
system, as in Britain over the last two decades, have made derivation of a consistent cross-
time definition of SA more difficult. Moreover, we have shown that analysis possibilities 
may differ depending on whether one has access to panel data derived from a household 
panel survey or from administrative registers. Related, the between-interview histories of 
benefit receipt in household panel surveys are subject to seam problems that make consistent 
continuous benefit histories difficult to derive – a key reason for focusing on a dynamic 
probit models rather than a survival analysis approach to analysis of individuals’ benefit 
receipt over time. Differences across countries in definitions and data sources reduce the 
comparability of estimates derived from country specific studies. 
 
The nature of the issues that are most pertinent or possible to analyse may also be country-
specific. For example, we have drawn attention to the trends over time in Britain in cross-
sectional rates of SA receipt and in annual SA transition probabilities. During the same 
period, there were also major changes to social assistance and other benefits, including the 
introduction of tax credits. Using multivariate analysis to study trends in rates and policy 
impacts requires data that span a long period of time. The BHPS meets this criterion, but the 
other studies of SA dynamics to date have used data spanning shorter periods. Instead their 
focus has been on different issues, such as differences in state dependence across regions, or 
between non-immigrant citizens and immigrants – topics that the BHPS is ill-suited to 
address. 
 
We have been cautious about attributing the observed changes over time to policy and to 
policy reforms. Although we have pointed to some explanations, a full-blown analysis of 
policy effects and causation needs a less broad study than this one, one that focuses on 
particular policies and particular groups ‘at risk’. 
 
We have added to the small but growing literature that finds that the Heckman, Wooldridge 
and Orme estimators of dynamic random effects probit models produce similar estimates. 
This is useful for analysts because the latter two estimators can be applied using readily 
available software rather than requiring specially-written program modules that are either not 
widely available or, if available, require infeasibly long amounts of computer time. Specialist 
modules continue to be required to fit models such as those allowing for unobserved 
heterogeneity in state dependence – an interesting topic for future research given our findings 
about observed heterogeneity in these effects. Another aspect worthy of attention in future 
research on SA receipt is the effects of a ‘history’ of receipt beyond the previous year – 
examination of second- or higher order Markov specifications. Another major issue to be 
addressed, and which requires specialist software, is the modelling of potential feedback 
effects. Not only may a number of demographic and other characteristics such as housing 
tenure determine outcomes such as SA receipt, but past receipt may also contribute to the 
determination of those characteristics.  
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  (1) (2)  (3) 
Age (years)  –0.0026    –0.0209    0.0012 
  (0.005)  (0.016)   (0.004) 
Female 0.0205    –0.0122    –0.0066 
  (0.078)  (0.166)   (0.057) 
Has health problem(s)  0.0968    –0.0186    0.1755 
  (0.072)  (0.131)   (0.053) 
Educational  qualifications        
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.1588  *  –0.4687  ***  –0.2067 
  (0.090)  (0.172)   (0.069) 
  A-level(s)  or  higher  –0.4909 *** –0.8168  *** –0.4981 
  (0.101)  (0.207)   (0.078) 
  Missing  –0.7866 *** –0.7464 *  –0.9422 
  (0.189)  (0.425)   (0.128) 
Spouse’s age (years)  –0.0011    0.0016    –0.0020 
  (0.006)  (0.019)   (0.005) 
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.1182    0.6346    0.3156 
  (0.231)  (0.560)   (0.184) 
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.0770    0.2415    0.0917 
  (0.231)  (0.565)   (0.182) 
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.2911    0.1016    –0.0222 
  (0.234)  (0.546)   (0.182) 
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.4654    0.1343    –0.2487 
  (0.335)  (0.733)   (0.261) 
Number of children in BU = 1  0.1907  *  –0.0528    0.1549 
  (0.109)  (0.220)   (0.083) 
Number of children in BU = 2  0.1282    –0.0964    0.1431 
  (0.112)  (0.217)   (0.087) 
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.3175  **  –0.0362    0.4526 
  (0.145)  (0.283)   (0.109) 
Age of youngest child < 5  0.4290  ***  0.2258    0.2280 
  (0.102)  (0.200)   (0.078) 
BU  type:  lone  parent  1.1871 *** 1.8468  *** 1.1054 
  (0.171)  (0.367)   (0.127) 
BU type: couple  –0.1685    –0.0625    –0.2816 
  (0.342)  (0.856)   (0.253) 
House  tenure:  owned  –0.7847 *** –1.0562  *** –0.6618 
  (0.079)  (0.165)   (0.059) 
Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.0489    –0.4867    –0.0854 
  (0.111)  (0.296)   (0.084) 
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0543  ***  0.0368    0.0445 
  (0.018)  (0.034)   (0.013) 
Instruments for SA receipt status at t =  1        
  Mother’s employment status missing  –0.1552    –0.2481    –0.3149 
  (0.258)  (0.535)   (0.200) 
  Mother not employed  0.1579  **  0.0373    0.0958   67
  (0.075)  (0.142)   (0.055) 
  Mother not alive  0.2094    –0.4777    0.2393 
  (0.214)  (1.086)   (0.177) 
  Father’s employment status missing  0.1420    0.2038    0.1288 
  (0.193)  (0.371)   (0.136) 
  Father not employed  0.0890    –0.1189    0.0274 
  (0.191)  (0.372)   (0.135) 
  Father not alive  –0.0689    –0.2387    –0.0845 
  (0.167)  (0.302)   (0.127) 
  Had job when first left full–time education  –0.1574    –0.0518    –0.0931 
  (0.099)  (0.206)   (0.071) 
 SEG  1
st job: manager or professional  –0.1119    0.6394  *  0.0155   
  (0.234)  (0.384)   (0.175)   
 SEG  1
st job: non–manual  –0.2903  ***  0.1019    –0.0924   
  (0.099)  (0.250)   (0.077)   
 SEG  1
st job: manual  –0.1136    0.0717    0.0221   
  (0.092)  (0.244)   (0.072)   
 SEG  1
st job:  other  0.0206  0.1347   0.2292  * 
  (0.191)  (0.440)   (0.137)   
Survey  year          
  1993        0.0544   
        (0.117)   
  1994        0.0246   
        (0.131)   
  1995        0.1334   
        (0.141)   
  1996        0.1868   
        (0.143)   
  1997        0.1627   
        (0.162)   
  1998        0.0375   
        (0.163)   
  1999        0.0859   
        (0.179)   
  2000        –0.1013   
        (0.199)   
  2001        0.1501   
        (0.179)   
  2002        –0.4039  * 
        (0.232)   
  2003        –0.1627   
        (0.225)   
  2004  or  2005        –0.2959   
        (0.225)   
Constant  –1.1130 *** –0.5191    –1.3565  *** 
  (0.292)  (0.699)   (0.213)   
Wald test for IC instrument validity          
  χ
2(11)  22.57   4.84   18.04   
 p -value  0.0203  0.9396   0.0807   
Initial conditions estimates for models shown in Table 6 above. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 















The probability of SA receipt at t = 1 (initial conditions):  
specifications including with interactions between lagged receipt, survey year, and lone parent status 
  Survey year  
interactions 
Survey year and lone parent interactions   
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  
Age  (years)  –0.0016   –0.0014  –0.0013  –0.0011  
  (0.004)   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Female    –0.0352   –0.0321  –0.0310  –0.0313  
  (0.058)   (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058)  
Has  health  problem(s)  0.2659  *** 0.2604 *** 0.2595 *** 0.2597 *** 
  (0.053)   (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.053)  
Educational qualifications           
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.2650  ***  –0.2693  ***  –0.2668  ***  –0.2650  *** 
  (0.071)   (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.071)  
  A-level(s)  or  higher  –0.6033  *** –0.6100 *** –0.6086 *** –0.6036 *** 
  (0.078)   (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.078)  
  Missing  –0.9621  *** –0.9665 *** –0.9707 *** –0.9777 *** 
  (0.119)   (0.120)  (0.119)  (0.119)  
Spouse’s  age  (years)  –0.0034   –0.0042  –0.0045  –0.0046  
  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.2662    0.2654    0.2745    0.2803   
  (0.179)   (0.180)  (0.179)  (0.179)  
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc  –0.0090    –0.0100    0.0019    0.0053   
  (0.176)   (0.178)  (0.176)  (0.176)  
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.1373    –0.1478    –0.1385    –0.1298   
  (0.176)   (0.177)  (0.176)  (0.176)  
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.4471  *  –0.4529  *  –0.4442  *  –0.4439  * 
  (0.261)   (0.262)  (0.261)  (0.261)  
Number of children in BU = 1   0.2318  ***  0.2321  ***  0.2293  ***  0.2282  *** 
  (0.083)   (0.084)  (0.083)  (0.083)  
Number of children in BU = 2   0.2928  ***  0.2864  ***  0.2863  ***  0.2830  *** 
  (0.086)   (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.086)  
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.5540  ***  0.5294  ***  0.5319  ***  0.5333  ***  69
  (0.112)   (0.113)  (0.111)  (0.111)  
Age of youngest child < 5  0.2446  ***  0.2490  ***  0.2479  ***  0.2481  *** 
  (0.079)   (0.079)  (0.078)  (0.078)  
BU  type:  lone  parent  1.2527  *** 1.2635 *** 1.2573 *** 1.2608 *** 
  (0.129)   (0.129)  (0.129)  (0.129)  
BU  type:  couple  –0.1632   –0.1219  –0.1163  –0.1145  
  (0.244)   (0.245)  (0.244)  (0.244)  
House  tenure:  owned  –0.7886  *** –0.7856 *** –0.7770 *** –0.7786 *** 
  (0.058)   (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058)  
Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.0976    –0.0992    –0.0917    –0.0932   
  (0.087)   (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.087)  
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0629  ***  0.0641  ***  0.0634  ***  0.0624  *** 
  (0.014)   (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Survey year           
  1993  0.2671  ** 0.2612 ** 0.2621 ** 0.2570 ** 
  (0.120)   (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.119)  
  1994  0.1387   0.1341  0.1269  0.1188  
  (0.134)   (0.135)  (0.134)  (0.133)  
  1995  0.3035  ** 0.3236 ** 0.3196 ** 0.3076 ** 
  (0.138)   (0.139)  (0.139)  (0.138)  
  1996  0.3533  ** 0.3566 ** 0.3502 ** 0.3472 ** 
  (0.148)   (0.148)  (0.148)  (0.148)  
  1997  0.4934  *** 0.5065 *** 0.5000 *** 0.5004 *** 
  (0.163)   (0.164)  (0.162)  (0.162)  
  1998  0.2640   0.2821  0.2738  0.2598  
  (0.172)   (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.172)  
  1999  0.3738  ** 0.3957 ** 0.3932 ** 0.3846 ** 
  (0.174)   (0.175)  (0.173)  (0.173)  
  2000  0.3110   0.3043  0.2939  0.2844  
  (0.202)   (0.203)  (0.202)  (0.202)  
  2001  0.3362  * 0.3540 * 0.3475 * 0.3303 * 
  (0.180)   (0.181)  (0.180)  (0.180)  
  2002  0.1642   0.1728  0.1770  0.1578  
  (0.196)   (0.196)  (0.196)  (0.196)  
  2003  0.2807   0.2976  0.3113  0.2972   70
  (0.212)   (0.213)  (0.212)  (0.212)  
  2004  or  2005  0.4834  ** 0.5022 ** 0.5036  ***  0.4912 ** 
  (0.194)   (0.195)  (0.194)  (0.195)  
Instruments for SA receipt status at t = 1           
  Mother’s employment status missing  0.0325    0.0225    0.0218    0.0275   
  (0.164)   (0.165)  (0.165)  (0.165)  
  Mother not employed   0.1331  **  0.1313  **  0.1276  **  0.1270  ** 
  (0.055)   (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  
  Mother not alive  0.2919    0.2897    0.2847    0.2938   
  (0.188)   (0.189)  (0.188)  (0.188)  
  Father’s employment status missing  0.1857    0.1833    0.1896    0.1907   
  (0.130)   (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.130)  
  Father not employed   –0.0342    –0.0282    –0.0335    –0.0295   
  (0.140)   (0.141)  (0.140)  (0.139)  
  Father  not  alive  –0.0536   –0.0524  –0.0485  –0.0504  
  (0.125)   (0.126)  (0.125)  (0.125)  
  Had job when first left full-time education  –0.0555    –0.0540    –0.0555    –0.0593   
  (0.072)   (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  
 SEG  1P
st 
Pjob: manager or professional  0.0306    0.0294    0.0349    0.0316   
  (0.175)   (0.176)  (0.176)  (0.176)  
 SEG  1P
st 
Pjob:  non-manual  –0.0940   –0.1021  –0.1047  –0.1073  
  (0.078)   (0.079)  (0.078)  (0.078)  
 SEG  1P
st 
Pjob:  manual  0.0716   0.0648  0.0650  0.0636  
  (0.072)   (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.073)  
 SEG  1P
st 
Pjob:  other  0.2033   0.1838  0.1764  0.1787  
  (0.143)   (0.144)  (0.143)  (0.143)  
Constant  –1.4977  *** –1.5202 *** –1.5249 *** –1.5194 *** 
  (0.211)   (0.212)  (0.211)  (0.211)  
Wald test for IC instrument validity                 
  χP
2
P(11)  18.92   18.33  18.39  18.87  
 p -value  0.0625   0.0741  0.0730  0.0634  
Initial conditions estimates for models shown in Table 7 above. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Test for instrument validity is a 
test that coefficients on all instruments are jointly zero. 
 